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INTRODUCTION
The growth of the academic literature of military 
strategy has been one of the major intellectual phenomena 
of the cold war era in the United States,, The literature 
has had a twofold effect on the various social science 
disciplines., The first effect is quantitative: a great 
amount of work is being done on problems that were once 
almost completely outside the ken of social scientists.,
The change is so striking that the incoming head of the 
American Political Science Association in 1961 was led to 
predict that national security analysis would become one 
of the important fffieldsn in political science and in the 
social sciences generally;^ this prediction has long since 
come true.,
Second, there is a qualitative effect: social 
science appears to have finally become a key element at the 
high levels of policy-making, as the following quotations 
indicate:
Collectively, (Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter,
Henry Kissinger and Thomas Sehelling) are the van­
guard and foremost representatives of a new element 
in the counsels of American Government: the Aca­
demic Strategisto
% e w  York Times„ Sept., 1961, p„ 25„
1
2
The two principal sources of this new theory are 
the simulated situations of the traditional "war 
games" and the transposition of the mathematical 
theory of games into military-political matching 
of wits and threats involved in deterrence theory*
. . . As a result, the traditional military strate­
gists have been replaced by a new breed of men » * * 
Herman Kahn, Thomas B* Schelling, Henry Kissinger, 
Donald Brennan, Oskar Morgenstern, Albert Wohl- 
stetter, Glenn H* Snyder*
Whatever the explanation, academics have moved 
into the military policy field, and have brought 
with them a degree of sophistication and intellec­
tual rigor never before s e e n * 2
The inspiration for this inquiry was, initially, a 
feeling of strangeness induced by a lengthy study of the 
literature on national security policy* Almost all of 
the works one encountered in this field seemed vested with 
a tremendously authoritative air, an air that one normally 
associated with scholarly work in the most well-established 
and systematically researched disciplines, Yet, clearly, 
the study of security policy, particularly nuclear deter­
rence policy, was not in any meaningful sense a discipline; 
and somehow, all this authority produced policy proposals
2Joseph Kraft, "The War Thinkers," Esquire, LVIII 
(Sept* 1962), p* 103= (for a similar comment by a social 
scientist who has written extensively in the national 
security area, see G* Lyons, "The Growth of National Secur­
ity Research," Journal of Politics, XXV (Aug* 1963)? 4^9- 
50$); M* Lerner, The Age of Overkill (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 19 62), p* 27; and J* B* Singer, "Arras Control and 
Beyond: a review of T* C* Schelling and Morton H* Halperin, 
Strategy and Arms Control; and D* Frisch, "Arms Reduction; 
Program and Issues," Journal of Conflict Resolution, V 
(Sept* 1961), 311c
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that one felt absolutely no urge to agree with® Some were 
at best questionable? e<>go, the assertion that there was 
a delicate balance of terror at a time when one could per­
ceive no visible reason to feel delicately balanced..
Others seemed absurd? e»g,, the casual assumption that the 
rational response to a nuclear strike on one’s cities is 
a counterstrike on the attacker’s cities„ Still others 
seemed absurd given one’s own preconceptions? such as the 
development of complicated contingency plans requiring 
more and different levels of nuclear and conventional arma­
ments, plans that seemed designed to further accelerate an 
already dangerous arms race® Finally, one did not know 
what to make of the assertion that nuclear war could be 
survived and was therefore ’’thinkable” when it was so ob­
viously (in Herman Kahn's odd locution) "unthinkable
The most frightening thing is that these intellec­
tually elaborate theories were not merely proposed as 
guidelines, but were in fact implemented as security 
policy®-^ It is amazing to note the cool, detached way in
^The "delicate balance" strategy was used to guide 
the Eisenhower security policy., "Counterforce" was a term 
used to describe the security policy of the early Kennedy 
yearsc "Spectrum deterrence" policy developed from a modi­
fied counterforce strategy and was used during the last 
years of the Kennedy administration., The term also aptly 
describes the policy in existence today® Spectrum deter­
rence strategy dictates that a country develop military 
power at all levels, from guerrilla warfare to general 
nuclear war, required to deter any aggressive activities by
4
which Secretary of Defense McNamara explained his policy of 
pure counterforce--direct retaliation against Russia's 
arsenal in case of attack--in July of 1962 and then a month 
later proposed that American policy was a "modified counter- 
foree"--direct retaliation against Russian cities--because 
the Soviets had "hardened" their missile s i t e s D e f e n s e  
Secretary McNamara changed his policy as easily and with 
the same lack of remorse as Thomas Schelling would change 
his strategy in a "non-zero-sum game0n^
the enemy0 For chronological descriptions of national 
security policy, see G 0 H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense? 
Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, M,J,t 
Princeton University Press, 1961); and S„ P. Huntington,
The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Poli­
tics (New York; Columbia University Press, 196l)« National 
security policy in the Kennedy^-Johnson era is discussed in 
Ho Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York? Anchor, 
1965}.' and Go Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston? Little, 
Brown and Co0, 19057°
^See Robert Si McNamara, address before the Fellows 
of the American Bar Foundation Dinner, Chicago, July 17, 
1962, Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs News 
Release #23$, pp.. 6-7; and New York Times. Aug. 2, 1962, 
p0 13° Go Lowe comments on the change in counterforce 
strategy in The Age of Deterrence, op0 cite, p« 239o
5l am referring here to the mathematical games 
Schelling plays in his Strategy of Conflict (New York?
Oxford University Press, 1963)4. A further example of this 
lack of remorse is found in certain statements by Herman 
Kahn, when he talks about the aftermath of nuclear war? 
"Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective 
studies indicate that even though the amount of human 
tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the 
increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the 
majority of survivors and their descendentso"
5
It occurred to me that this inculcation of academic 
theory into the real world of national policy-making might 
have a substantial effect on the whole foreign policy situ­
ation. What follows is an attempt to explain this effect; 
to demonstrate that present national security policy can 
only have a deleterious effect on the attainment of stated 
,fnon-security” policy. Such a study is especially needed 
because of the peculiar way in which the academic theorist 
and the foreign policy-making elite have become insensitive 
to the working realities of their strategy,^
^"Security” policy is distinguished from ”non- 
security" policy in Chapter I of this study,
7lt is of significant note that I blame both the 
intellectual and the policy-maker for this state of affairs. 
The policy-maker has accepted the theories presented by the 
scholar without regard to their practical utility. This 
condition has probably come about due to our society5s 
great respect for the claims of science and expertise. 
Indeed, it has not been the exception that the academic 
theorist has been given the authority to make American 
policy. John Bennett takes an interesting turn on this 
point. In his article ’’Moral Urgencies in the Nuclear Con­
text,” he submits that the academic community adds to the 
complex of power which Eisenhower mentioned. He illustrates 
his position with references to the link between RAND Cor­
poration's think tank and the Air Force on the one hand and 
with the universities on the other. Bennett warns that 
there is a danger we shall confront one vast establishment 
which includes business, the military, the civilian govern­
ment , the scientific community, foundations and the univer­
sities and that those who are most competent to criticize 
the policies of government concerned with national defense 
will be inhibited by their responsibilities in relation to 
these policies. For further reference see John C. Bennett, 
”Moral Urgencies in the Nuclear Context,” in John C. Bennett 
(ed°), Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience 
(New York? Scribner, 1962), pp. 112ff,
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Scope
It is apprepriate at this point to state some pre­
sumptions which seem most likely to influence my analysis 
of national security policy* The reader is urged to bear 
in mind that these are, for the sake of analysis, only 
asserted presumptions* I shall not attempt to defend them, 
but only present them so the reader may understand the 
scope of this paper*
To attempt an analysis of foreign policy requires 
a framework in which the interplay of different pressures 
can be observed and recorded* The research design used 
here is based on a simple proposition? the concept of a 
system is no less valid in foreign policy analysis than in 
the study of domestic politics*^ Like all systems of 
action, the foreign policy system comprises an environment 
or setting, a group of actors, and structures through which 
they initiate decisions* The latter two components of the 
system are discussed later* The operational environment 
contemplated in this study is essentially bilateral in
^It is not particularly relevant to this study to 
explain the components and workings of a systems design in 
international relations* It is to be conceded that the 
theoretical content of studies in foreign policy is wholly 
inadequate* However, the scope of this paper is so narrow 
as to preclude the use of an elaborate design as a research 
aid* The reader is referred to a design presented in 
M* Brecher, B* Steinberg and J* Stein, "A Framework for 
Research on Foreign Policy Behavior,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, XIII (March 1969), 75-102*
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nature* A bilateral system refers to the total pattern of 
interactions between two superpowers; at present, this re­
fers to relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union* The pattern creates an image of intensive competi­
tion and interaction in the diplomatic, economic and scien 
tific fields, with a different sort of competition in the 
military field* It will be recalled that the basic motive 
for this study is to uncover the effects of national 
security policy on the foreign policy arena itself* Such 
a study involves a focus upon the policy of both super­
powers *9
Hypothesis
Chapter I of this study is devoted to a descrip­
tion of United States and Soviet national security policy* 
The discussion in Chapter II has a twofold purpose* First,
9since the primary focus of the study is on the 
Soviet-American confrontation, there are certain related but 
distinct questions which it does not attempt to deal with at 
length* Specifically, other advanced countries, particularly 
those in Europe, have an important role to play in the in­
ternational system* However, from the point of view of this 
study, the contribution of Europe to the system is viewed as 
a distinct problem worthy of being dealt with in its own 
right* See, for example, Henry Kissinger, The Troubled 
Partnership* op* cit*; and Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver1*s 
Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (Hew 
York? McGraw Hill, 1968]* Similarly,while the accommoda- 
tion of Soviet-American competition in the developing areas 
is discussed, a full-scale treatment of the role of these 
areas in the evolving world system is not attempted* For 
a brilliant development of this point, see John G* Stoes- 
singer. The Might of Nations {New Yorks Random House,
1962}, especially chapters 4 and 5°
g
the "non-security” foreign policy objectives of both coun­
tries are presented and compared for divergence and com­
patibility o Second, these objectives are viewed in the 
light of national security objectives to demonstrate the 
following hypothesis;
Implementation of security objectives in the 
United States and the Soviet Union tends to 
frustrate the attainment of nonsecurity objec­
tives by both countrieso
Time Span Covered 
The period chosen for study was January 20, 1961» 
to January 20, 1969o There was a consistent political 
philosophy moving American executive policy-making during 
this periodo Moreover, there was little significant turn­
over in the top echelon of the executive department during 
the Kennedy-Johnson administrations„ There was, of course, 
a more substantial break in the governing elite of the 
Soviet Union during the period„ However, the ideological
motives determinative of Soviet policy remained relatively
1 0constant for both the Khrushchev and Breshnev regimes„
^ A n  entire meeting of the Academy of Political 
Science was devoted to discussions of trends in the Soviet 
Union after Khrushchev*, See S a Diamond (ed„), "The Soviet 
Union Since Khrushchev--New Trends and Old Problems," Pro­
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVIII
1 April 19h5), the entire issue0 ~~~
9
Methods and Sources Employed in the Study 
The problem of establishing, with a high amount of 
accuracy, foreign policy objectives for the United States 
and the Soviet Union is basic to this study* The method 
chosen for this study is one which focuses upon what may 
be called "elite articulation*" There is only one pre­
sumption involved in this method: foreign policy objectives
are what the foreign policy elite say they are* Such a
11focus implies certain limitations* First it raises the 
problem of properly identifying the foreign policy-making 
elite* Stated generally, the decision-making elite con­
sists of those individuals who perform the function of 
political authorization in the foreign policy arena* 
Political authorization may be defined as authorization 
sanctioned by the conventions of the system* This core 
group usually consists of the head of government, his 
department and his foreign minister; its size and composi­
tion will vary with the issue* The scope, nevertheless, 
will of necessity be narrow here: many may influence deci­
sions but only those who articulate them will be considered* 
In the United States, of course, the Chief Executive is 
charged with the conduct of foreign relations by law* The
For a lengthy discussion of these limitations and 
the use of "elite articulation" in foreign policy analysis, 
see S* Hoffman, Contemporary Theories in International 
Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N*J*s Prentice Hall” 1960), 
especially pp* 171ff°
10
President and his Secretaries of State and Defense are the 
American elites,, In the Soviet Union, the top echelon of 
the Soviet foreign policy-making apparatus is fused in the 
leaders of the Party Politburoo^2
The second limitation arises when one attempts to 
determine whether the articulations, expressions of opinion 
and statements of policy are particularly reliable indices 
of actual goalso One may infer them from actual behavior, 
or one may infer them from what the actors say about them, 
but in each case he is compelled to rely upon the intelli­
gent i nferenc e F u r t h e r m o r e ,  it is generally true that 
an individual is never fully aware of the forces that make 
for his own behavior, even though he may be aware of these 
forces in the behavior of others„ Finally, there is the 
problem of dissimulation in any of its myriad aspects„ An 
elite may articulate in order to generate an image, persuade 
an audience, demonstrate solidarity, plead a case or merely 
blow off steam,, Despite these pitfalls, however, freedom 
of speech is enough of a reality in the United States for 
one to accept that elite articulations do represent the
^2por further discussion of this point and for a 
listing of the high level members of the Politburo, see 
J0 F 0 Triska and D 0 Do Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy 
(New York? MacMillan & Co0 , 1968):-, pp» 75ff°
13perhaps the best discussion of the problem of 
inference is in A, L 0 George, Propaganda Analysis? A Study 
of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II 
TEvanston, ~I117? Peterson7' How,~ 1959) > especially chapter 4°
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opinions of those people for whom they purport to speak0 ' 
There is also justification for conceiving that enough free 
play has developed in the Soviet Union since Stalin's 
death for elite differences of value to come to light in ''j 
Soviet statements,,
The third problem is encountered when one attempts 
to identify those written materials that would most faith­
fully reflect the assumptions, expectations and policy of 
the elite0 After considerable research, I selected for 
the United States? Public Papers of the President— Kennedy 
anci Johnson „ a governmental publication of the speeches and 
news conferences of the President; the Department of Defense 
Bulletin and the Department of State Bulletin, the weekly 
official organs of the executive agencies most deeply in­
volved in foreign policy; the New York Times„ a privately 
published daily newspaper, most widely confided in and read 
by the governmental decision-making elite; and Foreign
Affairs, a quarterly journal privately published by the
1 h-Council of Foreign Relations in New York0
And for the USSR, I selected? Pravda, a daily news­
paper published in Moscow, organ of the Central Committee
^Other American sources of limited value were Con­
gressional Committee Reports and Hearings; The Congressional 
Record; Documents on American Foreign Relations (annual); ~
and The Congressional Quarterly Almanac■»
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of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Kommunist, 
a monthly journal published in Moscow, the theoretical 
spokesman for the Central Committee, both of these papers 
as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 
published weekly by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies 
in New York; and International Affairs, a monthly journal 
published in Moscow in several languages„ ^
The most difficult methodological step of all was 
working out a set of distinctions among the various foreign 
policy goals,, I have attempted to justify my distinctions 
in the first chapter,, In Chapter I, the goals of national 
security are presented in order that objectives of a 
decidedly "non-security" nature would come to light., Thus 
I have formulated two categories of foreign policy objec­
tives „ The first category is termed "security” and includes 
those objectives which are patently concerned with national 
security,, The second category contemplates those objectives 
which are, when taken at face value, "nonsecurity” oriented„ 
The second category is broken down into five sub-categories: 
foreign trade; foreign aid, participation in international 
organizations; space research; and cultural interchange,,
It is recognized that the second category of foreign policy
Mother Soviet sources of some help were Decisions 
of the Congress of the CPSU; Military Thought; and various 
articles from Red Star and Soviet Union as printed in 
The Current Digest„
13
»
objectives may have latent security underpinnings, but for 
purposes of discussion they can be distinguished from this 
underlying motive<>
A comment about the validity of my research design 
might be made at this point. It must be admitted that the 
method of research used in this study was somewhat selec­
tive, However, as it turned out, there were few surprises 
in the comparison of Soviet-American foreign policy objec­
tives o My results show close correspondence with indepen­
dent, more systematic and quantitative analyses by American 
scholarso For this reason, it is submitted that one may 
regard the method as a valid one.
CHAPTER I
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND 
ITS OBJECTIVES
If self-preservation is the first law of nature,
it is also the first law of foreign policy,. Safeguarding
the security of the nation is the foremost obligation of
the statesman according to Nicholas J„ Spykmans
Because territory is an inherent part of a state, 
self-preservation means defending its control over 
territory; and because independence is of the 
essence of the state, self-preservation also means 
fighting for independent status„ This explains 
why the basic objective of the foreign policy of 
all states is the preservation of territorial 
integrity and political independence„1
Admittedly, this basic goal is seldom stated so 
badly0 For instance, Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
phrased it this ways ,TTo build our strength so that the 
things we believe in can survive is the practical and
2vitally necessary expression in times of moral dedication*," 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that "The 
broad goal of our foreign policy is to enable the people
1 Nicholas J„ Spykman, Americans Strategy in World 
Politics (New Yorks Harcourt, Brace & World, 1942), p „ 17°
^Dean G„ Acheson,."The Shield of Faith," Department 
of State Bulletin, XXIII (November 20, 1950), S00o
1A
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of the United States to enjoy, in peace, the blessings of 
liberty*”3 President John F 0 Kennedy believed that 
America’s basic goal was to "seek a peaceful world community 
of free and independent states, free to choose their own 
future and their own system so long as it does not threaten 
the freedom of others*”^ However articulated, it is the 
same goal? preservation of the national security of the 
nation, which is a basic premise underlying the attainment^ 
of other foreign policy objectives,,
Few concepts are at once so fundamental, and yet 
so elusive, as this one* In common with many other ideas 
that must be dealt with in the study of foreign affairs, it 
is a relative concept„ Its meaning for individual nations 
will be determined by numerous variables; history, geography, 
cultural traditions, strategy and tactics in war, the 
nature of the economic system, and public opinion, to men­
tion but a few of the influences* Nations may be, and fre­
quently have been, mistaken in their estimates of what 
constitutes security» Hitler, no doubt, believed that 
attacking Poland, France, and later Russia would promote 
German security,, His miscalculations had disastrous
3John Foster Dulles, "Our Foreign Policies in Asia,” 
Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (Feb* 2$, 1955)» 327°
^•John F 0 Kennedy as quoted in Dean Rusk, "America’s 
Goal--A Community of Free Nations,” Department of State 
Bulletin, XLVI (March 1962), 449°
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consequences for the German nation,.
Security is one of those elastic terms like "due 
process" or democracy,, Almost every nation is in favor of 
it in the abstract, both for itself and generally for other 
nations,. But nations disagree violently over what it means 
in concrete circumstances* So great may be the different 
conceptions of it that security for one country can mean 
disaster for another,, For the Kremlin, security might, and 
possibly does, mean nothing less than a communized world, 
directed from Moscow* For the United States it conceivably 
entails the eventual extinction of communism as a militant 
ideology* Such examples suggest that attempts to achieve 
security can lead to a strange paradox? while security is
i
the underlying foreign policy objective of every nation, 
concrete efforts to achieve it are productive of endless 
insecurity throughout the international community as a
whole*^
Still another attribute of the security concept 
requires emphasis* A nation’s conception of security is 
never static* It changes over the years* The explosion 
of the first atomic bomb by the Russians in 194-9» for 
instance, revolutionized official American thinking about
^This paradox is closely linked to the present 
hypothesis and is more fully discqssed in the conclusion*
17
f)national security„ By 1957s another major change in 
American ideas about security was necessitated by the suc­
cess of the Soviet Union in launching Sputnik by means of 
a giant long-range missile,, Security* then* is closely 
linked with technological progress„ New inventions like 
the aircraft carrier* long-range bombers and missile-armed 
submarines contributed to the security of the United States„
The reader need be cautioned that preservation of 
national security is by no means the only basic goal of 
statecraft,, William P 0 Gerberding suggests that there are 
two fundamental goals of foreign policy,,? Gerberding sub­
mits that the central concept in international politics is 
’’the national i n t e r e s t I t  is generally accepted that 
any government pursues foreign policies that it believes 
will be in its nation’s best interest„ As used by Gerber­
ding* "national interest” means the security and well-being 
of the nation and its citizens„ Whatever protects or
^It has been suggested that Russian development of 
nuclear weapons as a means to security policy was prompted 
by American nuclear superiority as demonstrated at Hiroshima« 
For a discussion of this kind of "self-fulfilling prophesy*” 
see Samuel P„ Huntington* The Common Defense* op„ cit „ * 
chapter 6„
?William P„ Gerberding* United States Foreign Pol- 
icvs Perspectives and Analvsis TNew York?" McGraw Hill„
i9fe)7 P : 9:  ........... —
% o r  another conception of "the national interest*” 
see Hans Morgenthau* In Defense of the National Interest 
(New York? Random House* 1951~) <> ^Morgenthau pleads for an
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promotes these conditions is said to be "in the national 
interest 0"
In this paper, "security" means physical safety, 
territorial integrity, and political independence,, "Well- 
being" is much more difficult to define,, It surely has an 
economic dimension, but it is much more than thato The 
well-being of a citizenry requires the preservation of its 
cultures and values, of its way of lifeD
The well-being of a nation is sought for its own 
sake; it is not a means to another end„ The United States 
presumably desires and would be willing to assist in the 
creation of a free, prosperous Europe or Latin America even 
if such a condition were not so clearly desirable from the 
standpoint of American security„ Similarly, the Soviet 
leaders may actually believe it intrinsically desirable for 
Eastern Europeans and Asians to live under an independent 
regime even if the Soviet Union had.no stake in it«
If one examines the history of American postwar 
foreign relations, he may note several categories of policy
American foreign policy which shall follow "but one guiding 
light--The National I n t e r e s t W h i l e  he is not explicit in 
regard to the meaning he attaches to the symbol "national 
interest," it becomes clear that the author is thinking in 
terms of the national security interest, and specifically 
of security based on power„ Morgenthau?s concepts cannot 
be effectively used here, because I am not able to conclude 
that national interest and national security are synonymous 
termso
19
objectives which have, at face value, a nonsecurity motive„ 
Both the Democratic and Republican parties have supported 
reciprocal trade with other countries, Technical assistance 
to underdeveloped countries has also received bipartisan 
supporto So have economic aid, the United Nations, dis­
armament, political independence df colonial peoples, 
peaceful development of space resdarch and cultural inter­
change. These goals have formed important elements in 
American foreign policy since 1945» For analytical pur­
poses, objectives ih the foregoing categories are assumed 
to be pursued for their own sake. When a nation proposes 
that it intends to promote the economic development of a 
new State, it will be presumed that there is no intrinsic 
security motive.
It is conceded that a difficulty inheres in the sug­
gested distinction between those Objectives that are de­
sired for their own sakes and those that are instrumental 
in character * In the realm of values, one man's set of 
priorities may bear little or no relationship to the next 
man's. As intimated above, the objective of preserving a 
free Western Europe is purely a defensive expedient to some 
Americans, whereas for others it constitutes an extrinsi- 
cally important objective, which should be pursued at great 
cost simply for its own sake, regardless of the bearing on 
national security,. However, these distinctiorls are useful
for present purposes and will recur throughout the paper. 
For some policies the relationship to national 
security is much more direct. Among the patent security 
objectives are provision of military arsenals, extension 
of military assistance to other countries, maintenance of 
strong military alliances, control of markets involving 
strategic goods, and development of an effective intelli­
gence network. These objectives directly enhance the 
nation’s security.
In summary, there are two basic goals of foreign! 
policy? to enhance the security of the nation and to pro- \ 
vide for the well-being of its citizenry. The first goal I 
‘involves defense policy--the development of a country’s ] 
military potential--and the attempt to influence the actipns 
of other countries, whether by organizing them in efforts 
of collective defense or by creating an environment which 
is favorable to that country. The second fundamental goal 
includes those objectives the pursuance of which bears no 
obvious relation to national security. In the period with 
which this paper is concerned, the following objectives 
could be included? reciprocal trade; economic aid to under­
developed countries; participation in international organi­
zations; space research; and cultural interchange.
It is helpful at this point to take a closer look 
at the realities of the first goal--national security. No
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lengthy documentation is needed to prove that the policies 
of the United States toward Soviet Russia in the present 
decade have been more concerned with security objectives 
than have its policies toward Canada and India» Russia 
poses a perceived threat to the United States; Canada and 
India do not. The United States will naturally be less 
motivated by security considerations in dealing with its 
friends than with its avowed diplomatic enemies„ Let us 
then compare the security objectives of the United States 
and the Soviet Unionc
American National Security Objectives 
There are six specific objectives of UoS» security 
policy.. The first objective of U»S0 policy is to find a 
peaceful basis for relationship with the Soviet Union and the 
rest of the world„ Every American leader since World War II 
has stated this as the prime objective of security policy.,
As the world begins to change and as grandiose military solu­
tions become mutually ruled out, the goal of the United 
States is to develop a modus vivendi„ a more agreeable way 
to live with the Soviet Union in the same world0
Objective number two is the prevention of all wars.
If this goal is not attained clearly all other goals—  
including "winning over eommunism!,--become relatively 
meaninglesso The anticipated cost of a large- or small- 
scale nuclear war, as every modern president of the
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United States has realized, makes this goal one of pre­
eminence *,
Objective number three is closely related to the 
first two. This goal has been exhaustively discussed in 
and out of government*, Let us use a kind of shorthand 
here and say that the objective calls for the maintenance 
of an "adequate” level of military posture that deters 
aggression*^ The effect of this objective is that mili­
tary preparedness, quite apart from specific crises, has a
10tendency to escalate„ Moreover, the continuous change 
in military technology creates a continuing apprehension 
that any temporary balance may be upset by future develop­
ments*, Research must be pursued on a very broad plane to 
preclude the possibility that the opponent will score an 
unmatchable breakthrough in a weapons system,, The best
protection is normally judged to be to move to production
11oneself,,
The fourth goal of American security policy is to
9For a detailed discussion of this objective, see 
Lyndon B„ Johnson, "A Special Message to Congress," Congres­
sional Record, XXXVI (Jan„ 1S, 1965)s 1-2*,
^^Morgenthau, Singer and Phillip Green scathingly 
criticize maintenance of a spectrum military posture on 
this pointo
^The proponents of a new anti-ballistic missile 
system constantly argue that the Soviets have developed a 
"new" warhead capable of carrying several nuclear devices 
and that the United States must move to production a new 
ABM system to counteract the Soviet breakthrough,,
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master the arms race; to moderate it, preferably to reverse
it, and to create new arrangements for military security
which conform to the new realities of our age."^ In his
first State of the Union message a few days after his
inauguration, President Kennedy announced!
I have already taken steps to co-ordinate and expand 
our disarmament effort— to increase our programs of 
research and study--and to make arms control a cen­
tral goal of our national security policy under my 
directiono The deadly arms race, and the huge re­
sources it absorbs have too long overshadowed all 
else we must do. We must prevent that arms race 
from spreading to new nations, to new powers with 
nuclear capability and to the reaches of outer 
s p a c e 3
This means a wide variety of arms control measures and con­
trol of the environment so that "Nth” countries will not 
acquire the ability to provoke war or entangle the super­
powers „
The fifth vital American interest is in winning the 
battle against communism in the developing societies. There 
seems to be a popular belief among present-day American 
elites that communism must be halted in the emerging nations 
if the United States is to protect herself from a communist 
takeover. In his first major defense statement, President
f^This objective seems wholly inconsistent with the 
previous objective.
13John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message, 
January 30, 1961, Public Papers of the President--J. F. Ken- 
nedy, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.? U.S. Government Printing 
Office", 1964), 'p. 37°
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Kennedy had this to say about communist "wars of libera­
tion" in the emerging societies:
The free world’s security can be endangered not only 
by a nuclear attack, but also by being slowly 
nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our 
strategic power, by forces of subversion, infiltra­
tion and intimidation, indirect or nonovert aggres­
sion, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, or 
a series of limited warsc
In this area of lbcal wars, we must inevitably 
count on the co-operative efforts of other peoples 
and nations who share our concern. Indeed, their 
interests are more often directly engaged in such 
conflictso The self-reliant are also those whom it 
is easiest to help--and for these reasons we must 
continue and reshape the military assistance 
program o . . 0H
The last sentence of the presidential statement suggests an 
interaction of objective number five and objective number 
three. Countries threatened by a communist regime should 
be given military aid with which to maintain a posture 
against such an incident. Secretary McNamara was more ex­
plicit :
To deal with the Communists (in the developing 
areas) requires some shift in our security think­
ing. We have been used to developing big weapons 
and mounting large forces. Here we must work with 
companies and squads, and individual soldiers, 
rather than battle groups and divisions. In all 
four services we are training fighters who can, in 
turn, teach the people of free nations how to fight 
for their freedom. At the same time our strategic 
weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated, 
we must learn to simplify our tactical weapons,
1̂ -The President of the United States, Recommenda­
tions Relating to Our Defense Budget (Washington, B.C.? 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), House Document
#1 2 3, pp. 1-2.
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so that they can be used and maintained by men 
who have never seen a machine more complicated 
than a well sweep 5
The last national security objective of the United 
States is to be first in space; to assure that these 
regions will not be used as touchstones for aggressive 
attacks on the United States» Be securing positions of 
dominance in space, American elites hope to pre-empt its 
use for military purposes by another power0 This objective 
is closely intertwined with the first three<> An insight 
into UoS„ security policy in space can perhaps best be ob­
tained from Robert S. McNamara’s reply to congressional 
committee questioning early in 1963"
I think there is no clear requirement for military 
purposes for United States operations in space as 
we look at the future today. However, whether 
there will be a military requirement in the future,
I don’t know. But should one develop, it could 
come so quickly in a field in which the lead time 
for developmental technology is so long that I be­
lieve we must anticipate that possibility today 
by carrying out certain of the development work 
associated with putting a man in space for mili­tary purposes0l6
T5Robert S D McNamara, Address to American Bar 
Association, July 17, 1962, op0 eit. , pB 60
"f^U.So, House of Representatives, Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appro­
priations for 1964, Hearings, 88th Congress7 1st Sess«
Part 3 (Washington, D 0C0; U«S. Government Printing Office, 
1963), p° 335° A representative sample of documents and 
writings on American national security policy may be found 
in Do M 0 Abshire and R„ ¥ 0 Allen, National Security 
(New York? Praeger, 1963)0
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Soviet National Security Objectives 
In the last fifteen years there has grown up a 
considerable new body of Soviet strategic thought on the 
employment of security p o w e r ? One of the striking as­
pects of recent strategic studies is the close attention 
that has been devoted to U.S. security thinkings It 
should not, therefore, be surprising that there exist many 
parallels in Soviet and American security policy. Oskar 
Morgenstern, for examples, has pointed out: uIn their
approach to many (security) issues, entire pages could, 
by substituting the words Soviet Union and the United 
States for each other, be used for describing the American 
situation."^ U.S. security objectives, as we have seen,
1?One °f the most outstanding explications on 
Soviet security policy and military strategy is presented 
by Vo I. Sokolovsky (ed0), Military Strategy (U.S.SoR., 
1962)o Two U 0S 0 translations have been published commer­
cially: (1) Herbert S. Dinerstein, Soviet Military Strategy 
(New York? RAND, Prentice-Hall, 19 6 3); (2) Raymond L » 
Garthoff, Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts
(New York:- Praeger, 1963)= Page references to the Sokolov- 
sky study refer to the Prentice-Hall edition,,
^Oskar Morgenstern as quoted in Robert D„ Crane 
(edo), Soviet Nuclear Strategy, A Critical Appraisal 
(Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University, 1963), p 0 44» Many argue that 
Soviet security policy is implemented in reaction to Ameri­
can objectives and vice versa0 This condition of action- 
reaction has a tendency to reaffirm the original policy, 
thereby reinforcing hostile suspicions. It is suggested 
that this condition will continue until the two countries 
reach a level of hostility that verges on the brink of 
violence. The result is a fabricated predicament of dan­
gerous porportions and effects. This type of argument is
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might be summarized as peace, the deterrence of all wars,
the defeat of aggression* peaceful solutions to conflict
and disarmamento Similarly* Soviet objectives speak of
preserving and strengthening peace and developing the
world socialist system* of deterring world war* of curbing
imperialist aggression* of peaceful coexistence and of
1Qgeneral and complete disarmament» 7
The key to the real differences in Soviet and 
UoSo objectives is revealed by the underlined words„ Thus 
the Soviets are interested in peace to the extent that at 
any particular time it may seem the best situation within 
which to promote the development of communism0 "Peaceful 
coexistence*" said N„ S 0 Khrushchev* "must be correctly 
understoodo Co-existence is a continuation of the conflict 
between two social systems, but by peaceful means, without 
war o o . for the triumph of communism throughout the 
world 0" ^
quite eonvincingo For further reference, see note 6* page 
17 or John H„ Kautsky* "Myth, Self-fulfilling Prophesy, and 
Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict,’* Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, IX (March 1965), 1-17, reprinted in 
Peter A„ Toma and Andrew Gyorgy* Basic Issues in Inter- 
national Relations (Boston? Allyn & Bacon* 1967), PP. 277- 
295 o
^These objectives are summarized from SokolovskyJs 
work0 They are explained and described in greater detail 
in the following paragraphs., V„ I„ Sokolovsky* ojd0 cit<,, 
pp0 9^-100* 102-107, 271-274, 334=
S„ Khrushchev* A speech to the VI Congress of 
the German United Socialist Party, Pravda9 Jan0 17, 1 963, 
Current Digest, XV* No0 1* 13-17°
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However, the Soviets are not--like the United 
States--necessarily interested in deterring all wars, They 
hope to deter world war because they recognize the disad­
vantages for theme On the other hand, they actively support 
so-called "just wars of liberation” as a method of pro­
moting communism in situations where they have a strategic 
advantageo Premier Khrushchev5s speech of January 6 , 1961 , 
belongs to that species of policy statements in which the 
communist leadership discloses its interpretation of com­
munist dogma and sets forth the long-range objectives of 
their policy0 In the speech, Khrushchev redefined the use 
of war as an instrument of the communist revolutiono 
Khrushchev admonished his listeners to distinguish between 
various kinds of w a n  ”A war of liberation of a people for
its independence is a sacred war. We recognize such 
21wars0” By his definition, such wars fall within the 
framework of peaceful co-existence, and aggression occurs 
only when the United States--the imperialists--seek to 
block developing area advances by force or by non-violent 
methodso Among the resolutions adopted by the 22nd Con­
gress of the CPSU were the following?
The 22nd Party Congress considers it necessary 
to? steadily and consistently implement the
21 No So Khrushchev, A speech delivered to a Meet­
ing of the Party Organizations in the Higher Party School, 
Janc 6, 1961, Current Digest, XIII, No» 1, 3-4o
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principle of the peaceful co-existence of states 
with different social systems as the general 
security policy of the Soviet Union; » „ « 
develop and deepen cooperation with the national 
liberation armies fighting for independence from 
colonial oppression; » <> 022
With regard to the developing areas, Soviet 
security policy speaks in terms of ’’national liberation 
movements” but does not discuss in detail the strategies 
appropriate to these movements„ It is difficult to find 
evidence of substantial military expenditures in aid of 
such revolutions. Indeed, Jan F„ Triska and David D c 
Finley categorically state that the Russians do not offi­
cially send arms to the emerging nations<,̂ 3 However, 
the UoSi State Department, in 1962, listed military aid 
as totaling ten per cent of the Soviet-bloc credits to the 
developing areas„ The bulk of this military aid purportedly 
went to Egypt and I n d o n e s i a S u f f i c e  it to say, for 
present purposes, that Soviet interest in the emerging 
world has relatively few security connotations--at least 
at face value„
22»»Resolutions Adopted by the 22nd Party Congress,” 
Pravda, November 7, 1962, Current Digest, XIV, No0 7,
23Jan Fo Triska and David D„ Finley (eds,), Soviet 
Foreign Policy (New Yorks MacMillan and Co„, 196$), p0 272o
2%oSo Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research, The Sjno-Soviet Offensive Through 1961, Intel­
ligence Report NOo 8426 (Washington, DoC„, 1962) as cited 
in Peter A 0 Toma, "The Problem of Foreign Aid,” East Europe, 
XV (Feb. 1963), 2-9o
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The stated Soviet objective of total and complete 
disarmament seems to go further than the American desires 
in this regard,, Premier Khrushchev stated on June 15»
1961 r
If these /disarmament/ proposals of ours are 
accepted,* the peoples will forever be rid of 
the heavy burden of the arms race. We have 
stated, and I repeat, categorically, that if 
the Western powers agree to general and total 
disarmament, the Soviet Union is ready to 
accept any system of control,, „ „ „ In order 
to preserve and strengthen peace, it is neces­
sary to solve the problem of general and com­
plete disarmament with effective control,, The 
Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed that 
nuclear missiles be ended, that all weapons, 
including all stockpiles of nuclear bombs and 
their production banned forever„25
Published Yiews on Soviet space policy have under­
gone rapid change in the past two years. Prior to 1962, 
the Soviets claimed that their space program was directed 
only toward peaceful and scientific use„ While they con­
tinue to articulate a peaceful intent, they now argue 
that demonstrated U 0So intentions to exploit space for mili­
tary purposes have made it necessary for the Soviets also 
to consider using space for military purposes.26 Thus they
25No S. Khrushchev, Radio and Television Address, 
June 15 s, 1961, Pravda, June 16, Current Digest, XIII,
No. 24, 3-So Robert N„ Ginsbergh suggests that this objec­
tive seems to envisage a situation in which the disarmed 
West could not oppose the advance of communism by any means, 
in U 0S 0 Military Strategy in the Sixties (New York:
Norton, 1965), p. 12'3„
2^This point will be enlarged upon in the next 
chapter under the subheading of space research. For instant
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no longer insist that the military use of space is illegal 
and they point to Soviet space exploits as a clear demon­
stration of their superiority over the United States— a 
superiority which includes the capability of placing 
nuclear weapons in orbit and delivering them accurately 
to any part of the globe.^ The implication of their 
shifting attitudes toward space warfare is not yet com­
pletely apparent, although a former 7iee Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. M r  Force has concluded that this is the area in 
which "one of us probably will find the key to the stra­
tegic superiority of the 1970fs.’*:̂
Finally,, any consideration of national security 
policy must deal with the organizational machinery by which 
it is devised and implemented. It will not serve the pur­
poses of this study to dwell upon the bureaucratic struc­
tures of national security policy-making. However, for 
purposes that will become apparent in the next chapter5, 
there is a structure deemed worthy of note: the elite ad­
visory body on national security matters.
reference, see the article by B 0 Sin|gh, "Law As a Political 
Instrument: A Soviet Model," World Justice, 711 (Sept.
1966), 442-453o
^Sokolovsky, o£. cit., pp. 66, 176-179> 337* 424-
427 o
As quoted in Robert D. Crane, Soviet Nuclear 
Strategy, ojd. cit. , p. 62. Developments such as this one 
would seem to lend credence to the action-reaction-self- 
fulfilling-prophesy syndrome as suggested by Kautsky, "Myth," 
op. cit., see note 1 6, pp. 26 -27 of this paper.
The American National Security Council was estab­
lished by the National Security Act of 1947° Its stated 
function is to advise the President with respect to the 
"integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies 
relating to the national security so as to enable the mili 
tary services and the other departments of the Government 
to cooperate more effectively in matters of national 
s e c u r i t y F u r t h e r m o r e , the duties of the Council are 
"to assess and appraise" the objectives and commitments 
of the United States in relation "to its actual and poten­
tial military power, in the interest of national security, 
for the purposes of making recommendations to the Presi­
dent
The National Security Act also provided the 
United States with a tightly organized intelligence sys­
tem,, Section 102 (d) spells out the function of this 
agency0 The Central Intelligence Agency shall advise the 
National Security Council concerning such activities as 
affect the national security,,^ Thus the CIA acts as the 
eyes and ears of the president, through the National 
Security Council, in foreign relations involving the
2%ational Security Act of 1947» 61 Stat„ 496,
50 UoSo0oAo 401, SOth Congress (19473°
3°Ibido at 497, U.S.C.A. 403°
31Ibido at 499, U.SoC.A,. 407°
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national security of the United States„
The CIA presents a peculiar paradox among the many 
stemming from the conflict between security and American 
valueso At the entrance to the CIA headquarters is the 
inscription: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth
shall make you free."32 let the CIA does not confirm or 
deny published reports; never explains its organizations; 
never identifies its personnel; and will not discuss its
budget, its method of operation, or its sources of infor-
33 -mation. J So the citizen, as far as the CIAfs managers
are concerned, cannot, in fact, know the truth about an
agency, the directorship of which has been described as
"second only in importance to the President."^
This situation confronts the American system of 
government with a two-sided problem: how can there be public 
control over functions that require secrecy; and how can 
the effective operation of a two-party system of government
32ciA,s attachment to this inscription reflects the 
belief of intelligence professionals in the existence of an 
objective Mtruth" in world affairs. If "all facts" are 
gathered, they seem to assume, then the problems of policy- 
makers are virtually self-solving. This myth is shared by 
many policy-makers0 See P 0 W'. Blackstock, The Strategy of 
Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle, 19 64), pp° 43-49°
33ciA, "The Central Intelligence Agency" (mimeo for 
restricted circulation), Spring, 19o1, pp. 7-9° Existence 
of this pamphlet, itself, seems inconsistent with the 
policy contained therein.
3^U0So, Senate, Committee o,n Armed Services, Hear­
ings, Nomination of J, McCone, January 1&, 1962, p. 30°
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be assured when control of the Executive branch gives the 
party in power a potentially exclusive access to essential 
information in the field of foreign security policy*-^
The first aspect of the foregoing dilemma has cer­
tain ramifications which are significant to this study*
The statute creating the CIA provides explicitly that the 
Agency and the National Security Council are not decision­
making bodies* Intelligence agencies must have this detach­
ment from policy in order to assure the most forthright 
reporting on international affairs* However, the secrecy 
aspect of such an agency allows its functionaries either 
to develop its own policies or to lose contact with the 
informational needs of the elite*-^ When this condition 
occurs the intelligence network is no longer merely an in­
strument of policy but, in fact, wields "invisible” power
37either in the policy-making process, or in clandestine
35These two problems form the crux of H* H* Ran- 
somfs thesis in Can America Survive the Cold War? (New 
Yorks Doubleday, 1963)*
^Roger Hilsman Jr* recognizes this implication 
in "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs," 
as printed in James N* Rosenau, International Politics 
and Foreign Policy (New Yorks Free Press, 1961}, ~
pp* 209-219°
3?The concept of the "invisible" policy-maker is 
described in William M* McGovern, Strategic Intelligence 
and the Shape of Tomorrow (Chicagos Regnery, 19&1),pp* 23-28* ————
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operations in other countries,,^ The effect of this 
dilemma will be explored in the next chapter„
Let us now turn to the institutional role of for­
eign intelligence in Soviet foreign policy,, The Soviet 
Union understandably publishes little information about 
its function,, The description presented here is pieced 
together from fragmentary information publicly accessible„ 
We are not directly concerned here with the Secret- 
Police institutions for internal security of the Soviet 
state against its enemies,, The institutions that are 
directly involved in the foreign policy process are those
concerned with foreign espionage„ These have been part of
39the Secret Police throughout its history* The Central 
Committee for State Security is composed of subdivisions 
of three varietiest Main Administrations distinguished 
by function*^
The First Main Administration (Foreign Directorate) 
is charged with five continuing tasks" (a) collection of 
strategic intelligence regarding foreign countries;
(b) manufacture and dissemination of long-range propaganda;
3$For a good discussion of intervention in foreign 
internal politics see H* B„ Westerfield* The Instruments 
of Americans Foreign Policy (New York; Crowell, 1963), 
pp* 401-491.
39For a concise history of Soviet intelligence 
institutions3 see Triska and F i n l e y 0£» cit„ 9 p 0 460
^°Ibid0, po 47o
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(c) surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad; (d) penetra­
tion and neutralization of anti-Soviet organizations 
abroad; and (e) supervision of intelligence efforts of 
other Soviet intelligence organizations,,
According to E 0 A„ Andreevich* the operators of 
the First Main Administration work through various Missions 
to foreign countries*^ I could find reliable information 
on the Mission in Burma to provide an example
The Political Intelligence group in Burma was the 
largest (eleven members) and most authoritative0 It was 
directed and staffed by the KGB (Committee for State 
Security) and was primarily an operational agencyo Its 
primary objective was penetration and subversion of the 
local political regime through active participation in the 
domestic party struggle„ Analysis and gathering of infor­
mation was secondary <,̂-3 According to Kaznacheev, none of 
the policy decisions themselves were made from the mission,, 
These emanated from Moscow, or, probably in most cases, 
from the Party leadership,,
^ E 0 A. Andreevich, "Structure and Functions of 
the Soviet Secret Police," in S„ Wolin and R„ M„ Slusser 
(edSo), The Soviet Secret Police (New York: Praeger,
1957), pp7_96^T?9o —
Ao Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy: Ex­
periences of a Soviet Diplomat in Burma (Philadelphia; 
LippincottT" 1962)o ”
43i b i d Q , pp0 18S~202o
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Some account should be taken here of the context in 
which the Soviet Mission has been described0 The circum­
stances both of time and place undoubtedly mean that some 
of the specifics are applicable only to Burma„ It is to be 
expected that different environments would reveal differ­
ent organizational emphases„ However, the general struc­
ture and function of the Foreign Directorate in a develop­
ing country is representative,,
The foregoing summary of Soviet-American security 
objectives is designed to give the reader some perspective 
when he encounters the "’non-security" objectives of Chapter 
IIo Each of these security objectives will be repeated in 
Chapter II when it becomes involved with the attainment of 
a particular non-security objective„ The next chapters, 
therefore» will concern itself with three considerations; 
first, the nonsecurity objectives of the United States and 
the Soviet Union are presented; second, Soviet-American 
non-security objectives are compared for compatibility and 
divergence; and third, these objectives are analyzed in 
view of the various aspects of security objectives to 
demonstrate the effect security objectives have upon the 
attainment of non-security objectives.
CHAPTER I I
NON-SECURITY POLICY: AN ANALYSIS
It is to be recalled that there are five subcate­
gories of "non-security” foreign policy objectives: foreign 
trade; foreign aid; aid to international organizations; 
space research; and cultural interchange„ Soviet and Ameri­
can objectives in each of these subcategories are discussed 
below, The last part of the discussion in each of the 
subcategories is devoted to an analysis of the objectives 
in the light of national security policy.
Foreign Trade 
United States Objectives
Emergence of an increasingly prosperous, internally 
cohesive European Common Market in the early 1960!s signaled 
the end of a long era in American international economic 
relations, American policy-makers could follow one of two 
courseso They could endeavor to insulate the American eco­
nomic system from the impact of growing competition,abroad. 
Or3 they could chart a new course in the direction of 
liberalized and expanded trade by endeavoring to promote 
the maximum exchange of goods and services throughout the
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world0 Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, a number of 
advisors vigorously advocated the former course* Accord­
ing to this point of view, America’s economic welfare 
would be promoted to the extent that segments of American 
industry damaged by imports would be shielded by high 
tariffs designed to protect the system from "unfair” com­
petition,,^
The Kennedy Administration decided against this 
policy* In its view, the economic well-being of the nation 
would be far better served by imaginative policies seeking 
to expand global trade— even if this meant significant re­
duction in American trade barriers* The overall conclu­
sion, in the words of a writer for the Wall Street Journal, 
was that "it would be folly to suppose that other nations 
would lower their tariff barriers against American goods 
while the United States is putting fresh obstacles in the
pway of imports*'1
These were the principal factors in inducing the 
Kennedy Administration to sponsor a new tariff measure 
called the Trade Expansion Act of 1962* TEA preserved the 
earlier idea of reciprocal tariff reductions, but it also
iFor an argument in support of this position, see 
Douglas McCarthur II, "United States Trade Relations with 
the New Europe," Department of State Bulletin, #4$ (Feb* 4, 
1963), p* 173*
^Wall Street Journal, Aug* 23, 1961, p* 1*
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added new features not found in former trade legislation.
The bill provided that; (1) authority be granted to the 
President to reduce tariff rates on a reciprocal basis;
(2) authority be given to the President to eliminate tariffs 
altogether on products in which the United States and the 
Common Market countries collectively account for more than 
eighty per cent of global trade; (3) authority be given to 
American negotiators to secure reciprocal tariff agreements 
on categories of products instead of having to secure agree­
ments on thousands of individual items that might be traded 
between the United States and other countries; (4) there 
be no tariff cuts on imports when a danger exists that U 0S 0 
defense industries might be damaged by tariff reductions
The TEA was designed to fulfill President Kennedy8s 
conception of a "bold new instrument" for achieving Ameri­
can goals, which he summarized as follows;
1o to increase UoS„ competition opportunities in 
overseas markets;
2, to discourage UoSo economic isolation;
3o to prevent domestic inflation;
4° to increase export surplus;
5o to achieve equilibrium in the U 0S» balance
3These and other provisions of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 are discussed in Congressional Quarterly 
U m a n a c , XVIII (1962), 249-295o
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of payments,^
Soviet Objectives
The first appearance of a specifically stated Soviet 
foreign trade policy came in Khrushchev’s formulation of 
the 1961 Central Committee Report, It is not surprising 
that resolutions on the international economic scene later 
adopted by the Soviet Congress assiduously followed Khrush­
chev’s themes. According to the First Secretary himself* 
the report had been scrutinized and approved by each member 
of the Politburo,5 The Central Committee had presumably 
inspected and ratified the text when meeting for that pur­
pose a week before the Congress opened.
There were six major themes regarding Soviet for­
eign trade policy. The following formulations are my sum­
maries * using so far as possible the words of the original:
il
Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union to the XXlInd Party Congress--Report by 
Comrade N, S, K h r u s h c h e v , fhe Central Committee Report
-̂J, F, Kennedy* A speech to the United States Senate* 
January 31* 1962* Public Papers of the President--Kennedy*
1962 (Washington* D 0C,? U„S, Government Printing Office* 
W ) ,  pp, 68-69.
^Pravda and Izvetsia* October 16* 1961* pp, 2-11* 
as translated by S 0 Saikowski and N, Gruliow (eds,)* Current 
Soviet Policies IV (lew Yorks Columbia University Press* 
T9625* p, 42, ~
^Ibid,* pp, 43-46,
not only described the international environment but located 
the Soviet Union within it and identified tasks for the 
Soviet Union with regard to it„ The position of the UoS.SoRo 
included the following trade objectives?
1o to improve mutually advantageous economic ties 
with the socialist countries on the basis of 
long-term coordinated plans;
20 to seek normalized relations with the United 
States, built on principles of peaceful eco­
nomic competition;
3o to seek a greater volume of trade with the non­
socialist countries and the reduction of ob­
stacles to trade;
4o to expand petroleum lines in Europe;
5o to seek a Soviet-Japanese trade agreement and 
to develop cooperation with the great powers 
of Asia and Indonesia on a business-like basis„
If one were to compare the foreign trade objectives 
of the two countries, he would find that they are quite 
similaro Both countries seek to expand foreign trade with 
other nations of the worldo In doing so, both hope that 
the domestic picture will improve? the Soviets in terms of 
advancing production; the Americans in terms of increasing 
internal economic competition and of meeting the balance
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of paymentso The Soviets seek new sourees of supply to 
speed their rate of industrialization. They are willing 
to secure such supplies both from the countries of Western 
Europe and the United States. The Americans lowered tariffs 
to increase the volume of imports in order to achieve a 
parity in the balance of payments and to stimulate competi­
tion internally and with the European Economic Gommunity„
There is one point of divergence. The United States 
maintains a list of "strategic goods" to protect its defense 
industries. These goods are protected by high tariffs and 
other restrictions. Briefly, the essence of the "strategic 
list" is as follows: if a certain industry is vital to 
national security it is desirable to ensure a market for 
domestic producers by granting protection. In this manner, 
domestic sources of supply will be built up. It is rela­
tively easy, and I suspect quite natural, for an industry 
to persuade the Tariff Commission or Congress to allow them 
to come under the national security u m b r e l l a T h e  tuna 
fish industry has argued, with support of the Navy, that it 
is affected by national security considerations since it
^Raymond Vernon makes this point quite forcefully 
in "Foreign Trade and National Defense," Foreign Affairs 
Oct. 1955, p. 77ff.
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dsupplies vessels in war time. The lace manufacturers
have claimed defense status since they produce mosquito
netso^ "In the name of national security, the dairy lobby
succeeded in restricting imports of foreign cheese „ „ „
and the lead-pencil manufacturers claimed defense status
10because pencils were ’indispensable„’tt The absurdity 
of these seemingly altruistic claims illustrates the strong 
tendency for vested interests to wrap themselves in the 
vestiges of national security policy,,
These discriminatory restrictions not only de­
crease the volume of U„S„ imports, but they have the effect 
of making it more difficult for the Soviet Union to sell 
in the West, and therefore adversely affects the expansion 
of East-West trade„ Particular harm to East-West trade 
is done by uncertainty about changes in the strategic list 
and by divergent application of the rules by different 
countries„ Thus chemical machinery exported by Britain or 
West Germany may contain items covered by American patents, 
whereupon the United States applies its more restrictive
% o S , , Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimen­
sions of Foreign Economic Power, $7th Cong*, 2nd Sess„,
T962, Po 7o ~
9vernon, "Foreign Trade » „ ." ago cit. , p0 S0„ 
10Ibid„, po 79o
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definition and impedes sale to the socialist countries 
The case of the ban on exports of steel pipe is an even 
worse one0
In 1961, shortly before a French-Soviet trade agree­
ment was consummated, the United States placed steel pipe 
on its list of strategic goodso The agreement involved 
sale of this commodity to the Soviet Union, who intended 
to use the pipe to increase the volume of oil export to 
Eastern and Western Europe„ The French reluctantly honored 
the strategic ban„ According to Soviet comment, the agree­
ment would have tripled the 1957 trade volume between the 
two countries* The spirit of mutual understanding surround­
ing the negotiations was unprecedented and strategic
restrictions observed by France were deplored as the only
12obstacles to an even closer relationship,. It may be that 
the cancellation of the undertaking to supply steel pipe 
contributed to the failure of the EEC to fulfill the plan 
for gas in 1964, and so led to a fuel shortage*^ it is a 
matter of opinion that fear of repetition of such tactics
^For further discussion of this transaction, see 
Bo Balassa, Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Coun­
tries (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp° 32-37°
f o Triska and Ho Slusser, The theory and Law 
of Soviet Treaties (Palo Alto, C a l i f S t a n f o r d  University 
Press, 1963), p° 361 „
”*3see the news story on p, 3 of the New York Times, 
Octo 3, 1964c
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must affect the willingness of Eastern planners to rely on 
Western suppliers for important items* It is a matter not 
of opinion but of obvious certainty that such acts will not 
encourage East-West trade expansion.,
American relaxation of strategic trade restrictions 
might lead to a broader range of Western European— par- 
ticularly German— exports to the Soviet Union* Indeed* 
many Germans argue that since the Bonn government rules out 
most negotiations with Eastern European states, trade rela­
tions offer a means of establishing personal contacts which 
may eventually wean the East Germans away from Moscow.
The Soviets have not been innocent of the afore­
mentioned restrictions* They simply employ a different 
tactic* The Russians have made attempts to increase for­
eign trade, but relative to their total trade volume, rela­
tions with non-socialist countries have remained quite 
small*^5 When the Soviets do trade with countries outside 
their orbit, it is likely to be with smaller states like
^Triska and Slusser,' The Theory . . . , ojd* cit* * 
p* 362* Lord Keynes develops the theory that increased 
trade reduces antagonism and furthers the cause of peace 
in "National Self-sufficiency,n Yale Review (Summer, 1933)? 
especially pp* 756ff* The theory is tested by David Mitrany 
in A Working Peace System (New York? Random House, 1946)*
He quite effectively argues that the bonds of international 
order can be forged more rapidly by first concentrating on 
common problems in the less sensitive spheres of economic 
affairs *
^C.E.lo, East-West Trade (New York, 196$), p* 1$„
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Egypt or Burmao Egyptian cotton sent to Russia was dropped 
on the West German markets at low prices thus damaging the 
local markets for Egyptian cotton., The same has been true 
of Burmese rice0^  This evidence indicates that Soviet 
trade, up to the present, has been more of a "come on" 
device to cause dissension in the Western World than a 
device to create firm associations through the exchange of 
goodSo
It will be recalled that there is a mutual design 
on the part of both countries to expand foreign trade to 
improve domestic economies° The cost of maintaining and 
improving a spectrum level military posture has a signifi­
cant effect on the attainment of that goal» In 1963, the 
United States experienced a $4°3 billion deficit in its 
balance of p a y m e n t s I n  the same year the United States 
spent $4o1 billion on nuclear weapons alone» It could 
be argued that a reduction of nuclear arms spending could 
be used to cover the balance of payments deficit. In any 
case, a re-allocation of resources under arms control could
^% e w  York Times, Jan0 5 , 1962, p° 13° For a more 
detailed discussion of "dumping,* see UoN„E„SoC00„, ,TWays 
and Means of Promoting Trade" (E/3 3 8 9)., June 13, 1963°
^Statistical Abstract of the United States , 1963 
(U°S„ Department of Commerce, Washington, D„C0? UoS„ 
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 257°
1^Ibid o, pc 19S 0
s '
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ease the U<,S„ balance problem by reducing the need for im­
ports of both industrial and mineral products,,
A reduction in military procurement would also 
alleviate some of the Soviet economic problems by freeing 
for civilian purposes some of the best resources in the 
Soviet economy,, These specialized resources are needed 
and presently lacking for the expansion of Soviet industry 
Arms reduction would also permit the Soviet regime to re­
lease labor for the civilian economy, as it did in 1955$
20when two million men were demobilized,, Such additional 
manpower would make it easier to increase agricultural out­
put o More equipment, fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides 
from the chemical industry, which has neglected these pro­
ducts to concentrate on military items such as plastics and 
fuels for missiles, could be used to increase agricultural 
production„^ There seems to be complete agreement that a 
cutback in arms spending, particularly in the Soviet Union, 
would give a tremendous boost to internal economic
19Seymour Melman (ed„), Disarmament; Its Politics 
and Economics (Boston; The American Academy, 1962), p„ 140 „
20jo G„ Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military 
E s t a b l i s h m e n t Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Studies 
Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, $7th Congo, 2nd 
Sesso, p„ 43 o
21 This argument follows J„ P„ Hardt, "Strategic 
Alternatives in Soviet Resource Allocation Policy,” in 
Dimensions„ op0 cit„8 pp„ l8-20„
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22developmento Military spendings as it exists today, can 
only hinder and delay economic progress in both the United 
States and the Soviet Union„
Foreign Aid 
United States Objectives
In his annual Budget Message to Congress for 1963* 
President Kennedy stressed the following principles as 
American foreign aid objectives;
1„ to promote the economic development of coun­
tries in Asia, Africa and Latin America;
2<, to give assistance in relation to the ability
and willingness of developing countries to 
help themselves;
3o to make loans on reasonable terms rather than
grants and to accept payment in dollars rather 
than local currency;
4» to secure participation in foreign assistance
by other industrialized nations and to increase
22James L0 Clayton argues that defense expenditures 
served as a catalyst to push California's growth rate to 
unprecedented levels0 As a result, according to Clayton, 
the economy of the whole state was given new impetus and a 
lofty position of political power,, He does, however, leave 
the reader with the question of whether such a concentra­
tion of defense spending is really "good” for California,, 
See James L 0 Clayton, "Defense Spending; Key to Califor­
nia's Growth," printed in Davis B° Bobrow, Components of 
Defense Policy (Chicago; Rand McNally, 19 6 5}, pp» 175-
190o
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the role of private resources in assistance;
5» to support the steady growth of responsible, 
independent governments which will not be hos­
tile to the W e s t „ 2 3
Several significant trends in the formulation and 
administration of the foregoing objectives have proved note­
worthy o A fundamental one has been the evolution from 
primary reliance upon economic assistance (1943-1952), to 
primary reliance on military assistance (from 1952-1959), 
to establishment of a rough equilibrium between these two 
categories (1960-1965)
Second, the shift from outright grants to loans as 
the basic element in American foreign aid programs has been 
pronounced. During the era of the Marshall Plan, some 
ninety per cent of all American aid consisted of grants to 
other countries; by 1964? sixty per cent of all aid con­
sisted of loans, often made on long-term bases with low 
interest rates.^
Third, there has been a tendency toward greater 
selectivity in the provision of American foreign assistance..
23public Papers of the President--Kennedv, 1963,
OP o Clto , PP o 1°
^Agency for International Development, The Story 
of AID (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
no date).
25a iD, The Foreign Aid/Program Today (Washington, 
D 8G o“ U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 4.
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In the face of mounting legislative criticism of the for­
eign aid program* executive officials have carried out 
repeated reorganization of the principles which guide the 
extension of foreign assistance to other nations,,*^ By 
the early 1960’s, David E„ Bell, administrator of AID, 
said that his agency was following a policy of ”careful 
selectivity” in making aid allocations;
We are stressing aid to those countries where 
the United States interest is most urgent, which 
are in a position to make the best use of our 
help, and where other donors cannot supply all 
the aid needed,, As a result, of the $2„2 bil­
lion committed to &2 countries by AID in fiscal 
year 1963, four-fifths went to only 20 countries,, '
As was noted above, United States foreign aid can 
be divided into two basic categories; military and non­
military assistanceo To put the matter into some perspec­
tive, the following table shows the types of aid dealt with 
in the annual Foreign Assistance Act„
The information in Table 1 demonstrates one funda­
mental characteristic of U„So foreign aid„ Military expen­
ditures consistently account for one-half of the total 
foreign aid budget and have taken as much as a fifty-eight
26por a critical look at the legislative study re­
ferred to here, see "Report of the Clay Commission on For­
eign Aid,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (Sept„ 1963),
321-361o
2?AID, Foreign Aid „ „ 0 , cit., p„ 10„
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TABLE 1
UoSo FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS, 1960-1965a
Congressional Appropriations 
(millions of dollars)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Development Loans 750 730 806 812 745 770
Development
Grants 335 301 275 260 210 204
Alliance for Progress^ — — , 103 110 120 140 425
Miscellaneous0 500 620 1000 740 740
1800
200
Total Non- 
Military 1620 1725 2225 1840 1620
Military
Assistance 1720 1374 1450 1600 1500 1190
Supporting
Assistance^ 250 275 275 360 305 400
Total Military 1970 1649 1725 2160 1805 1590
Total Foreign Aid 3 5 GO 3390 3960 4110 3640 3340
aSources Statistical Abstract of the United States—
1968 (LLS* Department of. Commerce, Washington, D.G.: -D 0S 0 
Government Printing Office, 1969) <»
^Excludes technical assistance and development grants„ 
Gome part of this expenditure undoubtedly went for military 
purposes, although it was difficult to determine the per­
centage o
cIncludes appropriations for the Contingency Fund, 
International organizations, Administrative Expenses, and 
American schools and hospitals abroad,,
^Supporting assistance is designed to assure access 
to strategic military bases apd to enable the maintenance 
of larger armed forces for the common defense„ South Korea, 
South Vietnam, Laos and Jordan have consistently received 
eighty per cent of these funds0
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per cent slice of the assistance appropriations.. Another 
striking fact is that President Johnson5s first foreign 
aid budget was sharply reduced. Military appropriations, 
however, remained stabilized.
Soviet Objectives
In his Central Committee Report to the XXIIIrd 
Party Congress in March, 1966, General Secretary Leonid 
Brezhnev concluded his seetion devoted to the developing 
areas by succinctly restating the Soviet foreign aid policy 
formulated by Chairman Khrushchev ten years earlier;
"Our Party and the Soviet State will continue „ „ „u
1. to promote the economic development of coun­
tries in Asia, Africa and Latin America;
2. to finance projects which contribute to the 
industrialization of the recipients;
3. to limit aid to loans with low interest rates;
4 . to accept repayment of loans in commodities
which the borrowers traditionally export;
5o to grant assistance without imposing political
or economic conditions;
6. to support the steady growth of responsible, 
independent governments which will not be
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hostile to the East0^
Drawing heavily upon a perceptive article by David
29Beim, let us examine how closely the Soviets have fol­
lowed these objectives., Early Soviet commitments can 
generally be classified as efforts for temporary assist­
ance to balance American aide Soviet aid was concentrated 
in spectacular projects such as stadiums, hotels and dams, 
which appealed to the target regimes but accomplished little 
more„ In subsequent years most of the Soviet aid sought 
economic development„ Beim, analyzing all communist party 
aid through 1 963, comes to the conclusion that eighty-five
per cent was devoted to establishing and maintaining eco-
30nomic development
According to Beim, the Soviets hoped to develop 
ideological compatibility with the recipient countries by 
playing upon the developing areas® susceptibility to charges 
of Western imperialist motives and drawing maximum inter­
national attention to each commitment* However, to the
2Spravda, March 30, 1966, as translated in Current 
Digest, XVIII, No., 7, 23-37» To note the parallels between 
Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s position see the former’s 
speech to the XXth Congress, Pravda, Feb0 17, 1956, as 
translated in Current Digest» VIII, No„ 4, 6-7°
^^David Beim, MThe Communist Bloc and the Foreign 
Aid Game,” Western Political Quarterly, XVII (Dec. 1 964), 
764-799o
3°Ibido, p. 794o
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discomfiture of the USSR, the anti-imperialist dynamics did 
not extend to the adoption of Soviet political forms or 
support for Soviet international positions„ For example, 
while Nassar was eager to accept Soviet assistance at Aswan 
Dam, he was not willing to take a benevolent attitude 
toward domestic communists„ Quite the contrary--he sup­
pressed the Communist Party in Egypt„ Iraq, also culti­
vated by Soviet economic aid, similarly turned resistant
31toward a pereeived internal communist threat» The list 
of disappointments could be extended„ Suffice it to say, 
in late 1960 the Soviet Union abruptly suspended new aid 
commitments <,
Soviet leadership resumed making new aid commitments
in the latter half of 1 9 6 3, now apparently hoping for re-
32cipient neutrality„ By 1 9 6 4, the Soviet Union again 
announced extensions of $$90 million„ This amount was con­
sistently increased and reached a peak of $1265 million in 
1965o Relative to the Soviet gross national product, this 
sum approximates the amount of assistance granted to the 
new world by the United States in that year0
According to Beim, Soviet military assistance is
^Marshall I„ Goldman, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet 
Foreign Aid,” Foreign Affairs, XLIII, No0 2 (Jan. 1965), 
350ffo
3%),, Beim, "The Communist Bloc 0 , OjD, cit0,
Po 795o
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primarily ”a verbal contingency promise,” Soviet policy 
appears to be restricted to the assurance that in the event 
they should be attacked they may be confident of Soviet
TABLE 2
SOVIET FOREIGN AID TO THE DEVELOPING 
AREAS, 1959.65a
1200 1265
1154.51100
1000 1090
900 890
Millions
800
of United 748,5700
States 600
dollars. 5 52 .2
500
400
300
200
100
0
171 .4
1959 ’ 60 ’ 61 ' 6 2 ’63 *64 ' 6 5
information gathered from M. D. Simon, "Communist 
Interaction with the Developing States” (Stanford Studies 
of the Communist System, January 1966), printed in The Com­
munist Economic Offensive through 1965, U.S. Department of 
State, Bureau of Intelligence, RSB-65 (Washington, D„C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).
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assistance.-^ Doubtless, sizable quantities of arms have 
been delivered piecemeal to rebellious factions in coun­
tries as yet unfreed from "colonial b o n d a g e B u t  this 
has not formally involved the Soviet state.34 Apparently, 
the encouragement of social disorder through military 
means contradicts Soviet efforts to woo insecure regimes; 
this gambit is left to the Chinese„
In comparing the foreign aid objectives of the 
United States and the Soviet Union, a substantial amount of 
compatibility is evident. Both countries seek to promote 
economic development in the third world and to foster the 
growth of responsible, independent governments. A substan­
tial proportion of the assistance granted by both countries 
is in the form of loans, rather than gifts. The two coun­
tries differ with respect to the segment of the economy 
they wish to develop. The Soviets encourage industrial 
development specifically. The United States seems to be
33Ibid., p. 793; cf. Uri Ra* anan, "Tactics in the 
Third foprid." Survey, LVII (Oct. 1965), 30-34.
34see note 23, page 29. According to Geoffry Kent, 
there was a substantial increase in Soviet arms shipments, 
particularly to Egypt, in 1967. However, Kent qualifies 
his figures by stating that "it has not been Soviet policy 
to provide its clients with what, in Western terms, would 
be considered a satisfactory military capability."
G. Kent, "Strategy and Arms Levels, 1945-196$," Proceedings, 
Academy of Political Science, XXIX, No. 3 (19o9), 21-36.
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indifferent as to the area in which the assistance is used. 
This difference is hardly significant and seemingly comple­
mentary, The most notable divergence is the manner in 
which the aid is distributed., The United States allocates 
more than half of its aid to be used for military purposes0 
The Soviet Union earmarks nearly all of its aid for eco­
nomic development, This distinction holds ramifications 
for the instant thesis„
What has happened, then, is that the United States 
and the Soviet Union have assumed the task of ’’neutraliza­
tion” of the developing areas as a means of supplementing 
the effect of mutual deterrence„ A program of fostering 
economic development and military posture has been seized 
upon by both powers as a means of limiting the expansion 
of the other.
However, as long as aid is given as a tactic of 
security policy, a certain number of disastrous conse­
quences for the future of the new world will develop. The 
maintenance of foreign aid as a tactical weapon of security 
policy has lead to impressive military expenditures in the 
underdeveloped countries. Military aid is bound to have an 
impact upon the distribution of political power within a 
recipient country; it can also have a deleterious effect
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upon the economic system of that country.^ Military 
aid incites the country to engage in unproductive arms 
expenditures, which become weapons in the hands of opposing 
groups within each country,, Each group strives to use the 
arms to further its own particular interest, thereby dis­
rupting the political development of the country and deem­
ing impossible achievement of the very goal the contri­
buting country intends„
Political disruption and unproductive arms expen­
ditures frustrate the economic development of the country 
and prevent it from entering the world market except for 
the sale of raw materials and agricultural commodities„
All manufactured goods must continue to be purchased abroad„ 
Instead of attempting to encourage efficiency through in­
vestment of "social overhead capital,” the assisting coun­
tries have encouraged small arms races. The recipient 
countries are thus unable to satisfy the national demand 
for the goods of a modern society,,
This is also the appropriate place to note the 
effect of a large amount of foreign aid on the United States 
economy itselfo As was noted in the section on foreign 
trade, the United States has been running large
-^^This point is reaffirmed by Hans Morgenthau in 
"A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political 
Science Review, LVI (June 19o2), 301-310„
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international deficits, which have averaged some $4 billion
per year and which in the second quarter of 1963 rose to an
annual equivalent rate of over $5 billion, ^  This is the
same year that.$1,6 'billion in U,S0 military assistance was
37granted to the developing areas.
The problem arises out of the nature of the defi- 
cits themselves, These deficits have not originated in 
the merchandise balance of trade, which has usually shown 
substantial surpluses. Rather, the main deficit items have 
been direct military expenditures abroad and the portion of 
UoS, foreign economic assistance earmarked for military use. 
The dilemma is that neither of these two items can be re­
duced by domestic monetary restraint. Foreign military aid 
and foreign military expenditures are, therefore, direct 
causes of U,S. balance of payments deficits and will con­
tinue to be unless (1) the volume of trade is significantly 
increased to create a larger surplus or (2) military assist­
ance is discontinued,
3%. S„ Salant, et al,, The U,S . Balance of Pay­
ments (Washington, D 0C„; Brookings Institution, 1966),
p, 201,
37For convenient reference see Table 2, page $2,
3$The argument here draws heavily upon J, W» Angell, 
"The U,S. International Payments Deficit," Political Science 
Quarterly, LXXIX (March 1964), 1-24,
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Participation in International 
Organizations
United States Objectives
The financial troubles besetting the United Nations 
operations had become sufficiently grave by 1962 to re­
quire new measures for raising funds if the organization’s 
activities were not to founder on the rocks of bankruptcy„
Accordingly, the United States proposed the floating of a
\
$200 million bond issue (American officials proposed that 
the United States, itself, purchase half the bonds), to­
gether with a series of steps designed to relieve the UN 
of its financial distress * When this request was presented 
to Congress, it precipitated a lengthy and sometimes heated 
debate hetween legislative and executive officials, con­
cerning the American role in the United Nations cA®
In the end, Congress reluctantly accepted a modi­
fied version of the Kennedy Administration’s request for 
massive American support in solving the UN’s financial 
crisiso Congress authorized the Treasury Department to 
purchase up to a total of $100 million; the Treasury was 
prohibited, however, from making total purchases in excess
39UN Economic and Social Council, Official Records 
(New York, 1963); cf« New York Times, March 22, 1964* for” 
a list of deficits by country, p 0 1 3<>
^ F o r  a record of these debates, see UoSo, Congress, 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Review of U„S, Par­
ticipation in the United Nations, Hearings, &7th Cong-,
1st Sesso, 1962o Later cited as Review,
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of the total purchase by all other countries„ The Congres­
sional authorization in this particular instance was impor­
tant for two reasons? (t) it marked a point of careful 
reconsideration of D»S. objectives in granting assistance 
to international organizations and (2) these objectives 
were carefully articulated to serve as guidelines for 
future participation,, The authorization stated that the 
United States?
10 was ideologically attached to the principle of 
strengthening international organizations;
2c but, it would take a more critical, restrained 
look at the work of such organizations;
3o and, it would limit, if possible, large-scale
operational responsibilities of the recipient 
41organization,,^
Let us focus upon U.S. behavior, under the above 
objectives, with respect to a specialized agency of the UN„ 
The Special Fund is an international agency which has 
depended exclusively upon voluntary contributions from 
g o v e r n m e n t s I t  was set up in 1959 for the purpose of
41Ibido, ppo 92-105o
^The Special Fund was chosen as an example for two 
reasonso First, it is funded by voluntary contributions„
The contributing countries may lend monetary assistance, 
but there is no assessment involvedc Second, it is an agency 
about which there was Soviet-Ameriean interaction,, The 
interaction typified the effect national security policy has 
on Soviet-American objectives vis-a-vis international organi­
zations o
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financing preparatory and pre-investment projects in vari­
ous countries to make it possible for technical assistance 
and development to yield maximum results» In keeping with 
its mandate, the Fund concentrated on relatively large 
projectso The sum total of government contributions was 
million in 1960 and over $$0 million by 1964c The 
United States contributed sixty per cent of the total at 
first, but by 1964 had reduced its shared to thirty-seven 
per cento^
Soviet Objectives
The attitude of the Soviet Union toward inter­
national organizations has changed a great deal in the past 
two decadeso During the lifetime of Stalin, the UaSoS.R. 
largely ignored the UN, particularly its voluntary pro­
grams, or attacked them as imperialist dominated„ Cer­
tainly it did not contribute to them, since the aid went 
to countries which were "generally on the wrong side" of 
the revolution,, As new countries came into the UN, the 
power relationship changed,, With the ascendancy of Khrush­
chev, the General Assembly became dominated by weak nations 
and began to deal with problems which were merely tangen­
tial to major political decisions on international affairs.
^John G 0 Stoessinger and Associates, Financing 
the UN (Washington, D 0C o: The Brookings Institution,
'1964) , p. 57o
64
Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders adjusted to the 
new UN. They came to accept the fact major political deci­
sions are not made there. Vietnam is a clear example of 
the limitations of UN power,, The Pakistani-Indian negoti­
ations at Tashkent in 1966 illustrated again that although 
Security Council resolutions may lead to nothing, comparable 
decisions may be effectively arrived at outside the UN 
framework„ At the same time, the large membership of the 
General Assembly appears to preclude serious discussion 
and negotiation of delicate issues. However, the expendi­
ture of effort by the Soviet Union since Stalin testifies 
that they do not discount the UN as entirely impotent.
From the foregoing, it might be safely stated that
the Soviet Union tries to use the United Nations to advance
what it perceives to be its interests. Alexander Dallin
makes this point quite convincingly?
Soviet attitudes toward the United Nations and 
its specialized agencies have ranged from sus­
picion and scorn to a desire to capitalize on 
them for material, and especially, political 
ends.H
Where these interests appear to include frustrating Western 
policies, Soviets prove themselves accomplished at that 
art. Where these interests appear to include collabora­
tion across ideological barriers, the Soviets demonstrate
^Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United 
Nations (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 6S„ — — —
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a comparable capacity* In both cases the Soviet Union has
found the United Nations an important instrument of its
foreign policy*^
The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the UN
specialized agencies has been generally favorable* As an
authoritative Soviet account explains:
The specialized agencies play a certain role in 
the development of cooperation among the states 
in the technical, scientific and other fields*
However, their role in the case of peaceful 
cooperation should not be exaggerated* It is 
limited by the special framework of its activity*
More than that, the essence of certain specialized 
agencies is manifestly anti-democratic*^3
The U*S*S*Ro by the mid-fifties began to make small contri­
butions to the specialized agencies* When the Special Fund 
was established in 1959, the Soviets joined its support 
with a five per cent contribution*^^
The evidence suggests that Soviet support of the 
Special Fund was not motivated primarily by chauvinistic 
attitudes* In the eyes of the recipient states, the pro­
gram had become largely identified with the United States* 
On a number of occasions, the Soviet delegation to the
^ ibid* , p* 45ff<.
-̂6r o l * Malinin and S„ A* Bobrov, Organizatsiia 
0bfedinennykh Natsii (Leningrad, 1960), as cited in 
Dallin, The Soviet Union * * * , op* cit*, p* 70*
47john G* Stoessinger, "Financing the United 
Nations System," International Conciliation, DXXXVI 
(Nov* 1961), 197-210*
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Special Fund objected to projects in anti-communist coun­
tries like Formosa, South Korea, and South Vietnam, but 
never foreed a separate vote on any one given project
In summary, the place of international organiza­
tions in Soviet eyes is:
1o to strengthen international organizations, 
particularly those which will produce a 
political advantage;
2* to advocate limited expansion of large-scale 
operational responsibilities by the organi­
zations ;
3o to continue a critical approach to the work
of such organizations*^
The objectives of the Americans and the Soviets 
have moved to a point of convergence with regard to atti­
tudes toward international organizations* The Soviets 
have gone from a position of direct ideological opposition 
to international organizations to a guarded support of 
them* The Americans have moved from unconditional support
^Stoessinger, "Financing * . „ op* cit., p. 199»
Lv o v  summarizes various Soviet policy state­
ments on international organization in "United Nations: 
Results and Prospects," International Affairs, No* 9 
(Sept* 1965)j especially p* 8ff* This list of objectives 
was borrowed from Cd* Lvov’s study*
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of these entities to a rather restrained position,, During
the period of this study* both countries contributed to
the agencies of the United Nations, but both look with
jaundiced eye upon any program which might substantially
injure the interests of each, Triska and Finley sum
these attitudes as follows!
In a way, the United States has developed a 
tendency to view the economic, social, and 
cultural activities of the United Nations as 
one base for its anti-communist program,, After 
initial hesitation, the Soviet Union accepted 
the challenge; compartmentalization into cul­
tural, economic and social matters on the one 
hand and political matters on the other was not 
realistiCo In a sense, the USSR came to par­
ticipate in international functional organiza­
tions for the same reasons Stalin had decided 
to join the League and the United Nations! it 
was apparently to the political interest of the 
Soviet Union30
Consideration of Soviet-American interaction in 
the Special Fund lends credence to the foregoing summary 
and provides a touchstone for a discussion of the effect 
national security policy has on participation in inter­
national organization„ In 1960, it was recommended to the 
Special Fund’s governing council that twelve UN experts 
and some equipment be sent to the agricultural station at 
Santiago, Cuba, to study the fields of tropical husbandry, 
soil classification, conservation and crop diversification. 
The proposed project was to last five years„ It called
50jo F 0 Triska and D» D„ Finley, Soviet Foreign 
Policy, op. cit,, p„ 374°
68
for an allocation from the Special Fund of $1 million,,
The Cubans were to contribute $2 million.51
The project came up for approval before the Govern­
ing Counej_i 0f ^he Special Fund in May, 1961, a few weeks 
after the disastrous Bay of Pigs confrontation,. Needless 
to say, the American attitude was not conducive to approval 
of a project to aid Castro's island. Cuba was perceived 
to be a vital weakness in United States security system. 
American security policy dictated that aid to Cuba would 
not be in its "interest." The American policy toward Cuba
was to oppose "any source of aid and comfort to the present
52regime,” a policy based clearly on security ground. Yet, 
when the Special Fund was created, it had been agreed, at 
the insistence of the United States, that "political" con­
siderations would play no part in the allocation of aid; 
projects were to be determined according to economic cri­
teria. ̂ 3 The non-political voting record of the Fund would 
have been broken had not the American President decided 
that the United States would lose on a separate vote. The
51 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Hearings on the Special Fund, Feb. 1S, 1963.SSth Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 25ff„ —— —
^Statement of Richard N„ Gardner to Subcommittee 
on Foreign Relations, in Hearings on-the Special Fund, 
op, cit ., p. 2,
53lbid„ » p, 2G<, The unanimity rule governing the 
Fund's decision-making process had been unbroken up to con­
sideration of the Cuban Project.
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Cuban project was adopted, but not before Congressional and 
State Department opinion called into question the continu­
ance of the large American contribution to the Fund and 
other UN assistance„ One single project, representing 
one-half of one per cent of total Special Fund aid, prompted 
a Congressional examination and subsequent modification 
of UoS0 objectives simply because the project ran headlong 
into American national security policy,, 54
The Cuban Project demonstrated that it is extremely 
difficult for the United States to separate economic from 
security considerations0 This condition is exemplary of 
Soviet-American attitudes toward international organiza­
tion,, The chief losers are the underdeveloped countries 
and those in the West who believe that strengthened inter­
national bodies can do much to promote international 
stability and progress„
Space Research 
United States Objectives
American space efforts are a product of early mili­
tary initiative in space,, Space emerged as an area of
54According to Richard Gardner, re-examination of 
U.S. participation in the Special Fund, as described in 
Hearings on the Special Fund, op0 cit», led to a twenty- 
three per cent decrease in U 0S„ aid to the Fund. It also 
led to the fight that occurred over the UN bond issue as 
discussed supra» For an expanded explanation of this point, 
see R„ N„ Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order (New York: 
Praeger, 1966), especially chapter 4„
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military competition with the launching of the first Sput­
nik by the Soviets in October of 1957® The military impli­
cations, which were already understood by experts, suddenly 
became clear to all those who were willing to see0 The 
United States then turned to the task of recouping its 
military position and prestige,, In the next three years, 
the United States regained its face by surpassing the number 
of Soviet satellites to a significant degree„ It then 
placed its space efforts under the aegis of the National 
Space and Aeronautics Administration„ NASA was charged with 
primary responsibility for developing UoS„ programs for the 
peaceful exploration of outer space,, The National Aero­
nautics and Space Act of 1958 declares it to be "the policy 
of the United States that activities in space should be 
devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man­
kind
President Kennedy, in a news conference on May 9,
1962, outlined U„S„ objectives in outer spaces^
1o to cooperate in the peaceful exploration of 
outer space;
2o to accept Russian proposals for cooperation
55UoS0, Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Space 
and Aeronautics, National Aeronautics and Space Act, Hearings, 
$5th Congo, 2nd Sesso, 1958, p„ 381°
^Public Papers of the President--Kennedy, 1962, 
opo cite, p0 32o
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in unmanned exploration of the lunar sur­
face, in mapping the Earth's magnetic field 
and in establishing joint operational 
weather satellite systems;
3o to be first in space*
Let us see how well founded these proposals of the 
President are in fact* There are essentially three differ­
ent objectives as articulated by Kennedy^ peaceful use of 
space, cooperation with the Soviet Union and a prestige 
factor--striving to be "first*"
Peaceo--Though the stress on peace has obvious 
propaganda purposes, it does have a great deal of opera­
tional significance0 Most obviously, it very strongly 
reinforced the decision to place the space program under 
NASA, And, though there is cooperation between NASA and 
the Defense Department, NASA has gone to considerable 
lengths to avoid identification with military endeavors-- 
withdrawing from the geodetic satellite project, for ex­
ample, when the Department of Defense insisted that it be 
classified as " s e c r e t *"57 The man-in-spaee program remains 
under NASA's management despite Air Force ambitions in this 
field* And, the aura of publicity surrounding the space 
program obviously emphasizes its civilian, scientific and
57po s o Greenberg, "Space Accord? NASA's Enthusi­
asm for East-West Co-operation Not Shared by the Penta- 
gon," Science, CXXXVI (April 1962), 138*
72
exploratory aspects«
Cooperation* ■— -In the period under study, there have 
only been two instances of Soviet-American cooperation in 
space? a joint weather satellite system and a joint geo­
detic mapping system* The significance of these efforts 
relative to the entire space programs of both countries is 
discussed below*
Prestige*--The basis of this objective was explained 
by General Curtis LeMay, former Chief of Staff, United 
States Air Force? "Maintaining peace in space, as elsewhere, 
will be accomplished through d e t e r r e n c e * ” ^  Lyndon Johnson 
endorsed this theory of "peace,” though less clearly?
If peace is to be maintained on earth, free men 
must acquire the competency to preserve space as 
a field of peace before it can be made a new 
battlefield of tyranny* * * „ If we abandon the 
field, space can be pre-empted by others as an 
instrument of aggression*59
And President Kennedy said, "Only if the United States occu­
pies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether 
this new ocean of space will be a sea of peace, or a terri-
Z! Afying new theater of war*”DU By general consent the United
5 % * S 0 , Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, Military Procurement Authorization for Fiscal Year 
1964, Hearings, 88 th Cong*, 2nd Sess*, 19&3, p p * #96-#97.
^Congressional Record, CII (June 1$, 1963), 1*
6Qpublic Papers * * * Kennedy, 1962, op, pit *»
p* 669o
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States must remain "first" in space in order to assure ful­
fillment of the first objective--peaceful exploration,,
Soviet Objectives
E„ Korovin, writing for International Affairs 
(Moscow), indicated that the Soviet Union desired to en­
courage international cooperation in space and agreed to
abide by the rules of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of 
6 "1Outer Spaceo Korovin cited statements by Russian mili­
tary leaders that the Soviet Union was totally committed to 
formal securance of space neutralization and demilitariza­
tion^2
In a letter to President Kennedy on May 31 > 1962, 
Premier Khrushchev proposed a joint venture between the 
United States and the Soviet Union»^3 The venture was to 
include efforts tp map the earth's magnetic field and to 
establish joint operational weather satellites„ Two months 
later, on July 30, 1962, Khrushchev, in no uncertain terms, 
stated the Soviet objective "to fly /the first/7 Russian
1'Eo Korovin, "Peaceful Co-operation in Outer 
Space," International Affairs (Moscow), XXXII (March 1962),
32„
62See statements by Marshall G 0 p 0 Zhukov in 
Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, op0 cit», p„ 210„
63a summary of this letter is printed in the New 
York Times, June 1, 1962, p„ 32<>
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pennant over lunar soil."^
Thus, Soviet objectives are identical to American 
objectives in all respects. Both countries strive for 
peaceful cooperation in the conquest of space. However, 
the third space objective of each country, when taken to­
gether, are unmistakably contradictory; both countries seek 
to be "first" in space. This objective, when viewed as a 
matter of prestige, seems non-military in nature. Each 
country, quite naturally, would like to be first on the 
moon. Maintenance of pride, however, is a very thin facade. 
President Kennedy readily admitted that "I do not think the 
United States can afford to come in second in space, because 
I think space has too many military implications."^ As 
was noted in the first chapter of this study, if each 
country can maintain superiority in space, it reserves the 
potential to turn its advantage into a military threat.
The Soviets recognize this potential and rationalize their 
efforts to conduct their space program on a unilateral 
basis as follows?
The Soviet Union, which is resolutely opposed 
to the utilization of outer space for military 
purposes, cannot ignore all those preparations 
of the American imperialists, and is forced to 
safeguard its security against an attack through
6% e w  York Times. July 31 , 1962, p. 17.
^ Public Papers . . . Kennedy--1962, op. cit.,
p. 4&5°
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66outer space.
Yet both countries agree that space should not be 
the subject of competing claims; that cooperative experi­
ments should be undertaken and information exchanged; and 
that communications among nations should be improved,, It 
is submitted that some kinds of cooperation are virtually 
imperative for the success of the United States and Soviet 
programso NASA faces a very practical need for stations 
around the world for tracking space probes and receiving 
telemetered data from them,, There will be cooperative re­
quirements for space laboratories and stations for the 
exploration of other planets in the Solar system.
However, to date, there has been little coopera­
tion between the two countries. In 1963, a joint weather 
tracking satellite was launched. In early 1964, the 
United States cooperated with the Soviet Union in a mag­
netic field mapping venture. It is of significant note 
that both of these programs were terminated in 1965, when 
each nation accused the other of using the systems for 
military purposes. In answer to the concern some members 
of Congress displayed in reaction to these accusations, 
Secretary McNamara blithely responded?
^Statement by Marshall R. Ya. Malinovsky, late 
Soviet Minister of Defense, as quoted in B. Singh, 
tTLaw . o .w 0£. cit. , p. 447o See also note 2 6, pages 30- 
31 of this paper.
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I must admit that our operations in space for 
military purposes are truly quite extensive„
We have weather projects, we have mapping and 
survey projects--all of these for military pur­
poses,, We are working on a missile alarm system 
based partially on the joint /UoS„-Soviet7 
satellite operations„ „ . „ We are only in­
directly receiving information from the joint 
operations and only then to reaffirm the data 
received from our own systems,67
The two instances of Soviet-Ameriean cooperation 
seem slight efforts in view of the overwhelming similarity 
in objectives„ But to have even these ventures terminated 
because of a particular security need borders on incredulity„ 
The space environment for a long time will present 
a physical, not a social challenge; knowledge acquired by 
all nations will be of inestimable value to those who seek 
to explore space. The data becoming available is over­
whelming, the interconnection of disciplines is too per­
vasive and the skills of a nation are too dependent, for 
reasonable progress, on the knowledge of the other„ Surely 
it would be wiser to agree on the common use of national 
facilities, which would enhance the success of space ex- 
ploration0 Indeed, many argue that cooperation is a neces­
sary prerogative for the achievement of peace.,66 "In the
67u „S„, Congress, House, Committee on Appropria­
tions, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966, 
Hearings, 89th Congo, 1st Sessl, ppa 331-332o ~
^This objective is the first of those stated by 
both superpowerso
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broadest sense," says the Director of NASA’s Office of
International Programs,
we are seeking to reduce international tensions 
to transmute dangerous rivalries and ambitions 
into constructive communities of interest--in 
Europe, Latin America and elsewhere, and to es­
tablish patterns of cooperation in the world. . . . 
There has been a tremendous amount of sentiment 
here and abroad--and especially in the small 
nations--for international co-operation in ex­
ploring space in the hope that this might reduce, 
rather than expand, the dimensions of the cold 
war.69
However, as long as outer space represents a poten­
tial element of national security policy, both countries 
will pursue space exploration along unilateral lines. As 
President Kennedy recognized, "we are all anxious to co­
operate in the peaceful exploration of space, but to do so, 
of course, requires the breakdown of our nuclear barriers 
of hostility and s e c r e c y . As long as these barriers 
exist, the effectiveness of reaching compatible goals of 
"peaceful exploration of space” is decreased by a factor of 
one-half.
69a 0 W D Frutkin, "International Co-operation in 
Space Exploration," address at the 3rd National Conference 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as cited in Vernon 
Van Dyke, Pride and Power (Urbanar University of Illinois 
Press, 1964), p. 114.
^Public Papers . . . Kennedy— '1962, op. cit.,
p. 769o
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Cultural Interchange 
United States Objectives
The participants of the Twenty-second American
Assembly on Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations On Oct„
21, 1962, defined cultural affairs as comprising
the broad realm of educational, intellectual, 
scientific, and artistic activity. They are 
an essential and integral part of international 
relations, for they are concerned with contacts 
between people, the exchange of ideas, and the 
expression and confrontation of cultural and 
social idealso71
President Kennedy, within a month after taking 
office, created an Assistant Secretary of State for Educa­
tional and Cultural Affairso In a press statement on 
Febo 27, 1961, he saids ” . „ „ this whole field is urgently 
in need.of imaginative policy development, unification and 
vigorous d i r e c t i o n H e  would look to the Secretary of 
State, aided by the new Assistant Secretary, ttto exercise 
primary responsibility for policy guidance and program 
direction of governmental activities in this field0n72
Kennedy then appealed to the educational community, 
private foundations and voluntary organizations for still 
greater effort, noting that °these institutions represent
7lReport of the 22nd Assembly on Cultural Affairs 
and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press,
19 6 3) , p. 2,
72puhiic Papers » „ o Kennedy— -1961 , op>„ cit,,
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our national resource base for helping new countries educa­
tionally and strengthening our cultural ties with old 
ones."^
Private organizations and the academic community 
quickly responded to this fresh assertion of federal leader­
ship with new ideas for program improvement, a new willing­
ness to cooperate, and a new burst of private effort. 
Representatives of many foreign governments also made it 
clear that they welcomed this new American initiative.
Trust and charitable funds were created to help finance cul­
tural programs both in the United States and abroad.7^
Congress contributed to the effort by enacting the 
Fulbright-Hays Act in the fall of 1961 by an overwhelming 
majority. The new law consolidated the old Fulbright and 
Smith-Mundt laws and various other scattered legislative 
provisions, removed a variety of major obstacles to effec­
tive administration, and added several new authorities.75
73ibid., p. 19°
7^Among these institutions were the Pan-American 
Fund, Asian Fund, American Friends of the Middle East, 
International Market Institution and the Hamilton Fund.
These organizations are noted for reasons that will become 
obvious later.
^^For an historical discussion of the legislation 
on cultural matters, see American Assembly Report, op. cit., 
pp. 153ff; and C„ Frank el", The Neglected Aspect of Foreign 
Affairs (Washington, B 0C.: Brookings Institution, 1965),
pp. 132ff.
so
Co-sponsor Wayne Hays of Ohio later told the newly appointed 
U.S. Advisory Commission on International and Cultural 
Affairs, headed by Dr. John W. Gardner, "this law is in­
tended to give all the possible authority needed to develop 
the programs adequately. If you don’t find what you need, 
ask your lawyers to look h a r d e r . "^6
The following objectives received particular atten­
tion from the Assistant Secretary’s office, working in 
close cooperation with other federal agencies and numerous 
private experts and organizations:
1. to put greater emphasis on the AID program on
'human resource development in Africa, Asia and
Latin America as the sine qua non for social 
development ;
2. to provide new educational techniques, curricu­
lum reform and more books for these areas;
3. to improve schools for American dependents and 
to strengthen American-sponsored schools in the 
Middle East;
4. to encourage the exchange of educational tele­
vision programs and films, and to initiate a 
"reverse flow” of foreign artistic presenta­
tions to the United States;
5. to strengthen cultural relations with specific
76jvjew York Times, Dec. 13, 1962, p. 29o
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countries such as Japan, India, Spain, Poland 
and the Soviet Union,77 
A new phase of U,S, national effort was begun, but 
there were no miracles and a very great deal remained to 
be accomplished. Within the federal government, there were 
still many inherited deficiencies of organization and per­
sonnel to be overcome. And not least important was the 
problem of persuading the reluctant House Appropriations 
Committee that these activities were as vital to the suc­
cess of the nation1 s nwell-beingrt as military expenditures,
VSthough requiring far less money,'
Soviet Objectives
The view has prevailed for many years in the Soviet 
Union that art, science, and scholarship are instruments 
of the State and its policies, Soviet representatives are 
explicit in saying that while they believe in peaceful co­
existence between states with different social systems, 
they do not believe in peaceful co-existence at the
77UoS o, Department of State, American Cultural 
Goals» Bulletin No, 123, March 30, 1902,
7SC , Frankel makes this point in The Neglected 
Aspect , c , , 0£, cit,, pp, 154-162, The problem of fund­
ing various non-security objectives is consistently en­
countered in the areas of foreign aid, aid to international 
organizations, and space research. It is particularly men­
tioned at this point because cultural programs have re­
ceived the poorest monetary attention of any of the non­
security categories.
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79ideological level. Under the circumstances, it might 
well seem that genuine Soviet intellectual exchange in 
ideological areas such as the social sciences, literature 
and philosophy is impossible.
Despite these ideological barriers, the Soviets 
created the State Committee for Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries in 1957» apparently for the purpose of 
facilitating cultural relations with the United States and 
the United Kingdom. According to Frederick Barghoorn, 
this agency operates . .to regularize cultural rela­
tions, both with the ’bourgeois1 and ’socialist* states by
8nmeans of formal treaties and agreements.”ou
However, the Soviets have persisted in an isola-
ttxonist situation vis-a-vis cultural interchange and have 
responded slowly to the demands of other nations. To take 
some examples from the period up to 1966, a scholar re­
questing permission to study contemporary Moscow dialect 
was turned down on the ground that there were insufficient 
facilities for conducting research.^ Another scholar, 
requesting permission to study Soviet agriculture, was
79Report of the Soviet-American Citizens Conference, 
Leningrad, 1964, as translated in Current Digest. on. cit.. 
XVI, No. 8, 22-23.
^Frederick C. Barghoorn, ’’Soviet Cultural Effort,” 
Proceedings. American Academy of Political Science, XXIX,
N^7 T T T 567T 69 . —
^ New York Times, May 16, 1960, p. 21.
S3
turned down on the ground that he could find the informa-
dption he wanted by studying Mr„ Khrushchevas speeches,, 
American students in the Soviet Union have encountered 
restrictions on travel, difficulties in obtaining material 
from archives, and occasional harassment from the police 
American scholars and universities wanting to communicate 
directly with Soviet scholars whom they have wished to 
invite to the United States have waited unreasonably long 
periods of time before receiving an answer and have not 
infrequently received no answer at all„^
Last, but not least, there has remained the con­
stant problem of dealing with Soviet organizations osten­
sibly established to facilitate cultural exchange 
Frequently, these "front1* groups turn out to be instruments 
of Soviet political policy whose sole concern is to en­
courage the growth of parallel organizations in the United 
States serviceable to Soviet propaganda objectives„
Beyond the area of student and scholarly exchange,
York Times, Dec„ 12, 1961, p„ 1$„
^3yfew York Times, June 15, 1962, p„ 42 „
^-Frankel, Neglected Aspect „ » . , op0 cit.o, 
pp0 11S-129o
^5See the discussion of the VOKS organization and 
the SOD in Barghoorn, "Soviet Cultural Effort," ojd0 cit„
^Frederick C„ Barghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offen­
sive (Princeton, N„J<,: Princeton University Press, 1960),
p. 1£9o
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some success has been achieved„ The Voice of America may 
be heard in the Soviet Union„ Tours of the United States 
by groups like the Bolshoi Ballet or the Moiseyev Folk 
Dancers have not only given pleasure to Americans, but 
have probably helped to lessen the aura of strangeness 
surrounding the Russian c i t i z e n T h e  general movement of 
Soviet citizens across the Russian borders has enormously 
increased, and the officials in the American Embassy now 
see more Russians in a week than ten years ago they saw 
in a year„^
For the purposes of this study, it could be said 
that the only objective of the Soviets in cultural exchange 
is a negative one; that the Russians continue to be 
opposed to exchange0 However, Barghoorn suggests that this 
attitude has been somewhat softened„ He submits that if
the exchange serves to advance the political "image” of the 
Soviet Union, restrictions are relaxed,, Barghoorn describes 
Soviet cultural objectives, under the rubric of State 
policy, as follows5
1o to undo the harmful effects on the Soviet image
$7Frankel, Neglected Aspect » „ „ , ojd0 cit „ , p„ 1220
^Barghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offensive, op0 cite, 
p Q 99ffo A lack of Soviet statements on cultural exchange 
necessitated reliance upon such secondary material as 
Barghoorn*s studies0 It should be mentioned that Barg­
hoorn looks upon the Soviets with a very critical eye; 
almost unjustifiably so in some instances„
35
caused by the Stalinist rudeness, secrecy and 
violence;
20 to disseminate the idea that Russia be regarded 
as the chief world center of progress, spiri­
tual cultivation, enlightenment and humani- 
tarianism;
3» to allow foreigners to visit the Soviet Union 
to dispel the falsehoods created by the capi­
talist press;
to facilitate acquisition of useful knowledge, 
particularly scientific knowledge
The difference between an open and closed society 
is most dramatically shown in the area of cultural inter­
change o American objectives are to expand the opportuni­
ties for cultural exchange and encourage such expansion in 
other countrieso The Soviets, ostensibly, have indicated 
a willingness to participate in cultural exchange,, In 
actuality, they have gone to great lengths to frustrate 
exchange unless it happens to be politically expedient„
This is not to say there is no ulterior, chauvinistic 
motive behind UoS 0 objectives,, This is merely to indicate 
the significant divergence between the superpowers with 
regard to cultural inter change <,
g9Ibid», pp0 335-337»
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Gultural exchange, at its best, implies free move­
ment across national boundaries for the sharing of know­
ledge,, If one eould assume that the underlying objectives 
of the Soviet Union were to refurbish the Russian image in 
the eyes of the rest of the world, one would expect the 
Soviets carefully, but surely, to open their doors. A 
cursory examination of Soviet-American exchanges indicates 
that this has not been the case. According to Open Doors-- 
1964, published by the Institute of International Educa­
tion, out of the 53,036 foreign students in the United 
States in 1963, 37 were from the Soviet Union,, Of the 5,530 
faculty members from other countries who spent a major part 
of the year in the United States, 9 were Soviets. Of the 
2,427 American university members abroad, only 22 made an 
extended visit to the U.SoS.R. Seven of these were social 
scientists, 9 were medical men and 5 were natural scien­
tists.^^
Perhaps the greatest barrier to the freedom of cul­
tural exchange results from the chauvinistic attitude of 
the Russians. The communist university, whether in Russia 
or the satellite countries, is restricted to a program of 
indoctrination. It must teach the social sciences, not as 
they are, but as the government of the Soviet Union desires
90jnstitute of International Education, Open Doors-- 
1964 (New York? Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 6 - 8 0
&7
them to be«^ It would be fantasy to expect the Russians 
to expose students to a program which is inconsistent with 
that taught in Soviet schools,,
The United States is not free from this criticism,, 
According to the American Assembly, it is almost impossible 
to hold an international scientific convention in the 
United States because of the difficulties in getting promi­
nent scientists through visa and immigration barriers„
Under the present law, a scientist is almost certain to be 
ineligible for a visa, both because he belongs to an organi­
zation proscribed for security reasons and because he is
92liable to advocate subversive doctrines„
Nor are these the only factors that have played a 
role in impeding the realization of even the modest goals 
for cultural exchange between the United States and the 
Soviet Union,, In both countries, security considerations 
adversely affect free exchange of scholars„ Exchange of 
information is an integral part of nuclear strategy„93 un­
controlled increase in the volume of exchange would allow
9lBarghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offensive, op„ eit.,
p„ 234»
^ American Assembly Report, op„ cit,, p„ 1$9° This 
condition is not far removed from Soviet control of its 
educational process„
93For a discussion of the requirements for contem­
porary nuclear strategy, see Henry Kissinger, The Troubled 
Partnership, op, cit0, p„ 1$9ffo
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the Soviets to penetrate the U 0S 0 security establishment„ 
The United States would not be able to control the precise 
amount of information necessary to make the nuclear threat 
credible0 Carefully controlled exchange gives the Soviets 
"enough” information to make the threat credible„ Both 
countries, then* must restrict population movements so 
that each will receive the desired information about the 
other's nuclear arsenal. Although the Soviets claim that 
it is the Americans who bar certain fields of scientific 
investigation, particularly atomic research, from the ex­
change program, the fact remains that the Soviets have 
repeatedly nominated people to do research in the United 
States in these affected area, but have used the argument 
of insufficient research facilities to deny parallel re­
quests by Americans .94-
There is another area of conflict between attain­
ment of cultural objectives and security policy0 On Febo 
13? 1967si the National Student Association, largest col­
lege student organization in the United States, conceded 
that it had been receiving funds from the Central Intelli­
gence Agency since the early 1950!s<> The President of the 
MSA reported that CIA funds had been used to help finance 
the Association's international activities, including
94This point is made by Charles Frankel in "The 
’Cultural Contest,’" Proceedings, Academy of Political 
Science, XXIX, No. 3 (1969), 140-1$$.
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sending representatives to student congresses abroad and 
funding student exchange programs,95 On Feb» 17, the 
New York Times published a list of other organizations that 
were receiving CIA funds, The list included: International
Student Conference, Leyden, Netherlands; the U,S, Youth 
Council of New York; the World Assembly of Youth in Brus­
sels; The Pan American Fund; The Asia Foundation; American
Friends of the Middle East; International Market Institute;
96and The Independent Research Service of New York0
These revelations prompted demonstrations and com­
ments from the academic communities all over the world. As 
a Vassar sociology professor phrased it, ,T/the CIA~f under­
mines the official goals of American foreign policy” and 
has ’’subverted the independence of some research in major 
universities in the United States to the point where no 
American scholar can now be above suspicion when he goes
abroad,”97
An example of foreign reaction to these activities 
occurred a year later. The Asia Foundation, a private 
philanthropic organization, had been carrying out its oper­
ations in 14 countries between Afghanistan and Japan to
■ 95jjew York Times, Feb, 13 > 1967? p. 1*
9&tlew York Times, Feb, 17* 1967, p. 36,
97tJew York Times, Feb, 13, 1967, p» 7°
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promote cultural projects in these various countries0 The 
Foundation had spent nearly $1 million in India and was 
considering thirty proposals for new projects totaling 
$400,000c9^ On Feb„ 15* 1963, the Foundation was ordered 
to "wind up" its programs and leave India as a result of 
its acknowledgment that it had accepted CIA funds„ The 
Indian authorities even refused to issue new import 
licenses to the Foundation for books it distributed to 
Indian libraries and universities<>99
The reported CIA rationale was that it felt a 
responsibility to counteract Soviet infiltration of student 
organizations throughout the world„ If one were willing 
to accept the CIA statement that the Soviets, too, through 
their Central Security agency, were infiltrating cultural 
exchange programs, there can be no doubt that the two 
countries are creating such an aura of suspicion in an in­
herently innocent program as to render it relatively use­
less,,
9% e w  York Times» Feb„ 1 6, 1963, p B 9°
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CONCLUSION
The various national security objectives of Soviet- 
American foreign policy I have formulated above conflict 
in obvious ways with the attainment of stated non-security 
objectives of the two nations,, The chief problem within 
the Soviet-American foreign policy style is what I would
s
call its dualism, a deep fracture between two ways of deal­
ing with international issues«, This, in turn, leads to 
other sets of problems <>
The greatest manifestation of this dualism is a 
tendency to speak two -different languages, neither of which 
is entirely convincing and which are impossible to reconcile„ 
The first is the language of power» Here, superpower 
elites warn each other that failure to desist from hostile 
acts will be met with the full weight of national might„
The second is the language of community and harmony„
Leaders of both countries protest their sincere dislike of 
imperialism; they stress that they are disinterested 
nations which act out of necessity and responsibility, not 
selfishness; they explain that power is a tragic necessity 
but that peace, love, reason, bread, and friendship for all 
are the primary objectives0
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Of course, only a symbolic eagle can hold both the 
arrows and the olive branch easily at the same time.. When 
Russia accuses the United States of playing a classical 
game of power politics, she protests, pointing to her com­
munity ideals and aspirations for brotherhood; and the 
Americans find the use by other nations of traditional 
power plays to be nefarious and intolerable when they are 
her foes; disruptive and anachronistic when they are her 
friends*
Then, too, a kind of double standard afflicts each 
of these languages* In essence, both the language of 
security and the language of harmony are universal; they can 
be used by whoever wants to act in the world arena, yet 
Americans and Russians seem to ask for special treatment* 
Thus when either speaks the language of force, it does not 
quite avoid implying that although it recognizes power as 
a universal commodity and the necessary means for all 
nations to maintain security its power is somehow morally 
superior and deserves a privileged position; that it can 
trust itself but no others; and that others can trust it, 
but nobody else* The American objective of peaceful co­
operation in space leaves room for various more or less 
convincing rationalizations of why she should be allowed 
to maintain superiority in the space race*
There is the same double standard in talk about
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community., Americans stress reasonableness, the need to 
subordinate separate interests to the higher common good- 
But, at the same time, they suggest that their very dis­
interestedness thrusts upon them the task of being the 
trustee of the common good; they are the only people who 
see the whole picture and want nothing for themselves„
Each of the superpowers, in defining the common good, sees 
to it that its peculiar geographical position or its posi­
tion as the most powerful nation on earth is taken into 
account (for instance, limited war policy in Vietnam just 
happens to correspond with the possibility, enjoyed only 
by a superpower situated on a different continent, of 
waging war while keeping the home territory a sanctuary)„
The contradictions in this dualism require explana­
tion., No light is to be shed on them by talking about 
hypocrisyo A hypocrite is a man who deceitfully pretends 
that he is what he is not., Diplomats and scholars who come 
from a tradition of Machiavellian calculations tend to 
interpret all diplomacies in this way, and to see in double 
standards nothing but a shield behind which it is polite, 
profitable and practical to advance„ But things here are 
not so simple; the conflicts I have described in the pre­
ceding chapters do not seem to come from pretenses„ They 
come from the simple fact that the nation's value (and 
leaders) point simultaneously in different directions,,
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There is, in the Soviet-American foreign policy 
structure, a tension between an instinct of violence and 
the drive for harmony„ The United States, for example, is 
a nation intolerant of a conflict of ends., When Americans 
are faced with a fundamental conflict of ends, their ex­
perience has been to resort to force--considered the most 
decisive of all ways to end such conflicts„ In using 
force, they have sought not just the infliction of pain on 
the enemy, which Sehelling sees as part of the bargaining 
process, but the elimination of the conflict through simple 
elimination of the foe0 Whenever conflicts of purposes 
reappear, or when segments of the population feel 
threatened, the tendency to revert to force reasserts 
itself„
We thus are caught in a vicious circle„ The use 
of force, as we have seen, suffices to corrupt or destroy 
national objectives or to drive them underground., Central 
Intelligence operators are not the best agents of good 
neighborly relations; napalm is not the surest agent of a 
dream of "and end to war „ „ „ a world where all are fed 
and charged with h o p e T h e  sword swishes and cuts; the 
words dazzle and vanish., The security effort leaves its
^Lyndon Johnson, speech at Johns Hopkins Univer­
sity, April 1965s, quoted in Marvin Gettleman (ed0), Viet­
nam (Grennwich, Conn.,: Fawcett, 1965), p« 329 =
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mark, even if the result is not politically effective„ The 
real concentration of energies against real or imaginary 
foes acts to divert nations from establishing harmony,.
And there is another, most important difficulty" 
when force plays a pre-eminent role in international rela­
tions, to the extent of usurping other national goals, it 
tends to increase the insecurity of that nation,, The fate 
of Hitler®s Third Reich, and the consequences of certain 
steps in Soviet policy under Stalin illustrate this kind 
of inverse law about national security„
These criticisms will undoubtedly elicit from the 
reader the query? if all this is true, how have the two 
superpowers managed to survive? To this question, I have 
two answers. First, my purpose was not to deny the co­
existence but to describe the peculiarities that mar or
|limit ito To borrow a nice metaphor from Andre Gide, I 
was concerned with the lion's fleas, not with denying there 
is a lion under the fleas„ Second, and more important, 
the United States and the Soviet Union are entering into a 
period in which these flaws are more of an obstacle than 
they were in the paste The use of force, when it manifests 
itself, ultimately, in weapons of mass destruction, cannot 
in any way serve the purposes of a constructive and viable 
foreign policy,. The pre-eminence of security policy, as it 
exists in a nuclear age, can serve only to paralyze national
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policy, to undermine cooperative efforts, and to drive 
everyone closer and closer to the brink of destruction,, 
Theodore Draper has written that, in the Dominican crisis, 
the United States policy was marked "by such bungling and 
blundering that only the strongest power in the world can 
afford them0ir The question i s t  how much bungling can 
this power afford? If the lion cannot afford it, it must 
bite its fleas,,
^Theodore Draper, l,The Dominican Crisis,11 Commen­
tary, XX (Dec. 1965)s 61 o
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Abshire, David M. and Robert V. Allen (eds.). National 
Security. New York: Praeger, 1963°
Amster, Warren. Deterrenceo New York: MacMillan, 196S.
Almond, Gabriel M. American People and Foreign Policyo 
New York: Praeger, 1960c,
American Assembly of Cultural Affairs and Foreign Rela-
tionSo Report. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 19^47“
American Security Council. National Strategy Committee.
The Changing Strategic Balance--U.S.A„ VS. U.S.S.R. 
New York, 1967. “  — —
Archibald, K. (ed.). Strategic Interaction and Conflict.
Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, T966.
Armstrong, John A 0 Ideology, Politics and Government,in 
the Soviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1962.
Aron, R. The Century of Total War. Boston: Beacon Press,
1954 o
Associates in Political Science. U.S. Air Force Academy.
American Defense Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
' Press, 19&5 °
Balassa, Bernard. Trade Liberalization Among Industrial 
Countries. "New York? McGraw-Hill, 1967.....
Barghoorn, Frederick G. The Soviet Cultural Offensive.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.
Beaton, Lawrence and John Maddox. The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons. New York: Praeger, 19o2.
Bechhoefer, B. G 0 Post War Negotiations for Arms Control. 
Washington,~D„C .: Brookings Institution, 1961.
97
98
Becker* A„ S „ Soviet Military Outlays Since 1955°
Santa Monica? RAND Corporation* McMillan, 1964°
Bennet * John G0 Nuclear Weapons and Conflict of Conscience<, 
New York?" Scribner’s* 1962V-
Berliner, J» S 0 Soviet Economic Aid0 New York? Praeger, 
195S.
Bergson, A c and Samuel KuznetSo Economic Trends in the
Soviet Union., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1963o
Berzins, A 0 The Two Faces of Co-existence,. New York? 
Speller and 60ns, Ince, 1965o~"
Bidwell, Po Wo Raw Materials? A Study of American Policy. 
New York? Harper and Row, T9587 — ” — — ~
Blackstock, Paul W o The Strategy of Subversion Chicago? 
Quadrangle, 196 4o
Blum, Robert (ed0)0 Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations0 
Englewood Cliffs, N 0J0? Prentice-Hall, 1963° ~~
Bobrow, Davis B 0 (ed0)0 Components of Defense P o l i e y o 
Chicago? Rand McNally, 1965o ——™
Bornstein, Martin (edoK The Soviet Economy?^ A Book of 
Readings0 Homewood, Ill0? Irwin, 1962„ ™"~
Boulding, Kenneth E 0 Conflict and Defense„ New York?
Harper & Row, 1962 0 ” — —
Bousearen, A „ Ta Soviet Foreign Policy? A Pattern of
Persistence,, New York? Fordham University Press, 
T962o
Brennan, Do G 0 (edo)„ Arms Control, Disarmament and
National Security"!"" New York? Braziller, 1961 °
Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age0 Princeton,
No Jo? Princeton University Press, 1960„
Brower, Michael„ The United States National Interest»
Cambridge, Mass.? Center for International Studies, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1959°
99
Brzyzezinski, Zbigneiu K„ Ideology and Power in Soviet 
Politicso New York" Praeger, 19 6 1.
_______ and Samuel P 0 Huntington. Political Powers
U S A / U S S R New Yorks Viking^Press, 1 964T
Buchan, Alstair (ed»). A World of Nuclear Powers0
Englewood Cliffs, N„JoS Prentice-Hall, 19660
 . China and the Peace of Asia0 New Yorks
Praeger, 19660 ~  ~ ”
Bull, Hedley0 Control of the Arms Race, New Yorks 
Praeger, 19&1» ' '
Byrd, Robert D„ Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy„ Torontos 
University of Toronto Press, 1960o_
Clabaugh, Steven F„ East-West Trades Its Strategic Impli­
cations o Washington, D„C0s Georgetown University 
Press, 1964o
Clemens, William C c Toward a Strategy of Peace„ New Yorks 
Rand McNally, 1965°
Cohen, B 0 J„ American Foreign Economic Policy.. New Yorks 
Harper"FRH^77"TW7"^"~ .........
Coombs, Phillip H„ The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy0 
New Yorks Rand McNally, 19 6 40
Conference on Economic Aspects of Disarmament» Disarma­
ment and World Economic Interdependence„ New Yorks 
Co 1 umbTaT Univ ers ity Press, T967T ”
Cousins, Norman„ In Place of Folly„ New Yorks Harper 
Bros o, 1961o
Crabb, C D V c (ed0)0 American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear 
Agep New Yorks Harper and Row, 1965° —
Crane, Roberto Soviet Nuclear Strategy0 Washington, D„C0s 
Georgetown University Press, 1963»
Dallin, A 0 et al, The Soviet Union and Disarmament0 
New Yorks Praeger", 19&4« —— —
0 The Soviet Union and the UN„ New Yorks 
Praeger, 1962 „ — —
100
deRivera, J 0 The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy■> 
Columbus, Ohio: C 0 E 0 Merrill Publishing Co„
1968o
Dinerstein, Herbert S„ Soviet Military Strategy„ New Yorks 
RAND s Prentice-HiTlT7~T963 o
War and the Soviet Union, New Yorks Praeger,
1959 o
Earle, Edward0 Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton, N 0J„j 
Princeton University Press, 1943°
Etzioni, Amitae<> The Hard Way to Peace„ New Yorks 
Collier, 1962,,
Eulau, Heinzo The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics„
New York! Random House, 1963°
Evans, John W„ United States Trade Policy; New Legisla- 
tion for the Next Round<, New Yorks MacMillan,
1967 o ™ “
Finletter, T 0 K0 Foreign Policy: The Next Phase0
New Yorks ""Harper & Row, T960„
Fischer, George,, Science and Politics; The New Sociology 
in the Soviet Union0 Ithaca, New Yorks Cornell 
University Press, 1964°
Fliess, Peter J„ International Relations in the Bipolar 
World, New Yorks Random House, 19660
Frankel, Charles„ The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs. 
Washington,HD0C 0s Brookings Institution, 1966„
Fromm, Ericho May Man Prevail? New Yorks Doubleday, 19610
Fryklund, Richard» One-Hundred Million Lives„ New Yorks 
McMillan, 1962„ "
Gallois, Peter„ The Balance of Terror0 Bostons Houghton 
Mifflin, T 9 6 1°
Gardner, Richard N„ In Pursuit of World Order„ New Yorks 
Praeger, 1962„
Garthoff, R „ L 0 Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age„
New Yorks- Praeger, 19o2<,
. Military Strategy:. Soviet Doc 
New York: Praeger, 1963°
101
George , A o L O Propaganda Analysis? A Study of Inferences 
Made frotnNazi Propaganda in World War II0 
Evanston,'"jCTTo ? Peterson, Row, 1 959°
Gerberding, William P c United States Foreign 
Perspectives and Analysiso New York?” 19c —
Gettleman, Marvin (edc 
Fawcett, 1965°
Vietnam., Greenwich,
McGraw Hill. 
Cornu?
Gilpin, Roberto American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons 
Policyo Princeton, N„ J 0 ? Princeton University 
Press, 1962o
Ginsburgh, R, N 0 U 0S 0 Military Strategy in the Sixties» 
New York.? Norton, 1965° ~ ”  ' ~~
Green, Phillip0 Deadly Logic<> Columbus, Ohio: 
University Press, 1966°
Ohio State
Greene, Fred» UoS0 Policy and the Security of Asia0 
New YorkT- McGravMIiTT", 1968c
Hahn, William F 0 and Jo C 0 Neff0 American Strategy for
the Nuclear Age ° New YorkT- Doubleday & Co., 1960.
Halperin, M 0 A 0 Limited War in the 
Wiley, I9T 3T
New York?
Hammond, T s A 0 et al„ Making National Security Policyo 
New York? Praeger, 1962°
Hardt, J 0 P 0 Strategic Alternatives in Soviet Resource
Allocationo Washington, D qC 0? Brookings Institu­
tion, 1 962 o
Heilbroner, Robert,
1 962 o
Great Ascent0 New York? Harper Bros,
Hekhuis, S 0, T 0 McLintock and A 0 Burnso International
Stability? Military, Economic and Political Dimen­
sions o New York? ^iley, 1964,0
Hickman, Martin B 0 (ed0)0 Problems of American Foreign 
Policyo Los Angeles? Glencoe, 19680
Hilsman, Richard and R° C c Good (eds o)0 Foreign Policy in 
the Sixtieso Baltimore? Johns Hopkins Press, 1965
102
Hitch, Charles J» The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear 
Age„ Cambridge, Mass.,; Harvard University Press, 
TWQo
Hoffman, Stanley» Contemporary Theories in International 
Relations., New York" Prentice-Hall, 1960o
Gulliver^s Troubles; or The Setting of American 
Policyo New York; McGraw-Hill, 1r
Holsti, K0 Jo International Politics; A Framework for
Analysis"., ^nslewood 'Cliffs, NoJ0; Prentice-Hall.
1967 o
Holtzman, F„ D 0 (et},). Readings on the Soviet Economy„ 
Chicago; Rand-McNally, 1962 „
Horelick, A c L 0 The Political Use of Soviet Strategic 
Powero Santa Monica; RAND Corp0, 19620
Huntington, Samuel P0 The Common Defense; Strategic 
Problems in National Politics„ New York;
Columbia University Press, 1961o
Institute of International Education,, Open Doors--1964° 
New York; Columbia University Press, 1965<.
Irish, Marion D „ (ed0)0 World Pressures on American 
Foreign Policy0 Englewood Cliffy N 0J0; 
Prentice-Hall, 1964»
Jacobson, Harold K, America*s Foreign Policy„ New York; 
Random House, 1965° ~
Jasny, N 0 Essays on the Soviet Economy0 New York; 
Praeger, 1962°
Jessup, P. Go Controls for Outer Space0 New York; 
Columbia University Press, 1959-
Johnson, J° (edo) <> The Role of the Military in Undei
Countries0 "Princeton, NoJ0; Princeton University 
Press, 1962o
Kahn, Herman0 Thinking About the Unthinkable„ New York; 
Horizon Press, 19620
o On Thermonuclear War° Princeton, N°J„; Prince­
ton University Press, 1960°
103
Kaplan, Morton (ecL)o The Revolution in World Politics., 
New York: Wiley^ T9&2* ~ ~  ~~
and Nicholas Katzenbacho The Political Foundations 
of International Law0 New York: Wiley, 1961„
Kaufmann, W c W 0 (ed<,)0 Military Policy and National
Securityo Princeton, N„J0: Princeton University 
Press, 19560
Kaznacheev, A 0 Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of
a Soviet Diplomat in Burma„ Philadelphia: Lippin-
cott, 1962„
Kenen, Peter B 0 Oiant Among Nations: Problems in United
States Foreign Economic Policy0 Chicago: Rand-
McNally, 1963 »
Kennan, George F» Russia, the Atom and the Westo New York: Harper Bros„ , 1 958° — —  ——
Khrushchev, Nikita S„ Conquest without War: An Anthology
of the Speeches, Interviews and Remarks of Khrush- 
chevo New York: Simon and Schuster, 19610 ~~
Kindleberger, C» P, Foreign Trade and the National Economy„ 
New Haven, Conn„: Yale University Press, 196T°
Kirkpatricko L 0 B 0 The Real CIA0 New York: MacMillan
and Coo , 1 961^ — —
Kissinger, Henry A» The Necessity for Choice, New York: 
Harper Bros„,~1961 °
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: 
’Harper Bros. , 1957°
( e d o ) 0 Problems of National Strategy„ New York: 
Praeger, 19 6 6« — —
The Troubled Partnership0 New York: Anchor,
Knorr, Klaus and Sidney Verba„ The International System.,
Princeton, N 0J0: Princeton University Press, 1962,
For Victory in Peaceful Competition with .Capi 
talismo New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960o 
1 965.
104
Knorr, Klaus„ On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear 
Age. Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press.
T9^60
Kovner, Martin„ The Challenge of Coexistence» Washington, 
D 0C 0s Public Affairs Press, 1961c
Kulski, W 0 W c Peaceful Coexistence., Chicagos Regnery,
1959.
Larson, D 0 L„ The Puritan Ethic in U,S, Foreign Policy»
New Yorks Van Nostrand, 1966. ~
Lecht, L 0 A„ The Dollar Cost of Our National Goals„
Washington, D"7C 0 s National. Planning Association,
1 965 o
Lederer, Iva J„ (ed0)0 Russian Foreign Policy„ New Haven,
Conn,,: Yale University Press, 1962,
Lerner, M 0 The Age of Overkill0 New Yorks Simon and 
Schuster, 1962o
Librach, J. The Rise of the Soviet Empires A Study of
SovielTToreign PolicYo New Yorks Praeger, 196 4°
Liddell-Hart, B„ H„ Deterrent /sic7 or Defense. New Yorks 
Praeger, 1960°
Lowe, George. The Age of Deterrence. Bostons Little, 
Brown, 1965« ~~ ' ~
MacKintosh, J . M, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign 
Policy, New Yorks Oxford University Press, T953 °
Mason, E 0 S 0 Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. New Yorks 
Harper and Row, 19&4o
Masters, E„ D„ The Nation Is Burdened. New Yorks Knopf, 
1967.
McClelland, Charles A 0 (ed„)0 Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, 
and Future War. San Francisco? Chandler Pub­
lishing Co., I960.
Theory and the International System,, New Yorks 
MacMillan, 1967o
105
McGovern, W° Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of 
TomorrowF Chicago; Regnery, 1961°
Melman, S „ (ed.). Disarmament: Its Politics and Eco­
nomics o Boston: American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 1962=
Mills, Co Wrighto The Causes of World War 111= New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1953= —
Mitrany, David0 A Working Peace System, New York:
Random House, 194o° ~
Morgenstern, Oscaro The Question of National Defense»
New York: Random House, 1959°
Morgenthau, Hans J° Politics Among Nations° New York: 
Knopf, 1960o
In Defense of the National Interest„ New York:
Random House, 1951°
Mosley, P° E= (ed»)0 Soviet Union, 1922-1962= Princeton, 
N„JC: Princeton University Press, 1963°
Murray, T 0 E„ Nuclear Policy for War and Peace, Cleve­
land : World Publishing Go°, 19600”
Nogee, Jo L. Soviet Policy Toward International Control 
of NucTiar~5n¥rgyo South Bend, IndTT"~Hotre Dame 
Fress, 1961o
Osgood, Charles E„ An Alternative to War or Surrender„
Urbana, 111=: University of Illinois Press, 1962=
o Perspectives in Foreign Policyo Urbana, Ill0: 
University of Illinois Press, 1965°
Perkins, D „ The American Approach to Foreign Policy»
Cambridge, Mass°: Harvard University Press, 1962°
rev° ed°
Pincus, J° Trade, Aid and Development° New York:
Random~HousT96?” ~~~
Ransom, Howard H° Can Americans Survive the Cold War?
New Yorks Doubleday, 1963 ° — — ——
106
Rapaport, Anatolo Fights, Games and Debates» Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1960-
Report of the President’s Commission on National Goals„ 
Goals for Americans- New York? Prentice-Hall,
Reston, James S „ The Artillery of the Press? Its Influ­
ence on American Foreign Policy» New York?
Harper & Row, 196?°
Rock, Vo P» A Strategy of Interdependence„ New York? 
Scribner’s, 1964«
Rosecrance, R c N- (ed„)„ The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, 
New York? Columbia University Press, 1964= ~
Rostow, Walter The United States in the World Arena„
New York? "Harper, ■ 19667 - ~ ~
Rubenstein, A-0 Z„ The Soviets in International
tionso Princeton, N oJ0s Princeton University 
Press, 1964 c
Saikowski, 0 o and Leo Gruliow (eds-)- Current Soviet
Policies- New York? Columbia University Press,
Salant, W„ S„ _et al- U-S- Balance of Payments--!96S-
Washington, D 0C„? Brookings Institution, 1966-
Schapiro, Leonard- The U 0S QS 0R 0 and the Future- 
New York? Praeger, 1963°
Schelling, Thomas C- Arms and Influence- New York? 
Oxford UniversTt5T~Pres¥7~T96E7™-"
- Strategy of Conflict- New York? Oxford Uni- 
ver"sity~Press \ T963 -
__________ and Mo H- Halpering- Strategy and Arms Control,
New York? Twentieth Century Fund, 196T-
Schlesinger, James R - The Political Economy of National 
Security- New York? Praeger, 1960-
Schwartz, Urs- American Strategy?
New YorkT~lloubreday7~"1966 -
107
Scott, Andrew Mo and Ray H» Dawson (eds.). Readings in
the Making of American Foreign Policyo New York? 
McMillan", 1 96 5 °
Shubik, M„ Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social 
Behaviorc~ N e w  YorkT Wiley, 1964°
Singer, J0 David„ Deterrence,, Arms Control and Disarma-
ment„ Columbus? Ohio State University Press, 1962„
0 . Financing International Organizations, The 
Hague? Nijhoff, 1961° — ——
Snyder, George Ho Deterrence and Defense? Toward a Theory 
of National'Securityo New York? MacMillan, 1964°
Sokolovsky, V D l„ (edo)o Military Strategy„ UoSoS 0R 0,
1 962 o
Spykman, Nicholas J„ Americans Strategy in World Poli­
tics o New York? Harcourt, Brace and World, 1942°
Steel, R 0 Pax Americana0 New York? Viking Press, 196?o
(edo)o United States Foreign Trade Policyo 
New York? Wilson, 1962° —— —
Stein, W 0 Morals and Missileso London: James Clark, 1959°
Stoessinger, John G 0 _et al» Financing the United Nations, 
Washington, D „ C ° ? Brookings Institution, 1904°
The Might of NationSo New York? Random House,
1 962 o
o The U 0N 0 and the Superpowers° New York?
Random House, 1965°
Strachey, Jo On the Prevention of tfar, New York?
St o Mart in”s-Pr els 7_T9627
Thornton, T 0 po The T^jrd World in Soviet Perspective0
Princeton, N 0J 0? Princeton University Press, 1964°
Toma, Peter A 0 and Andrew Gyorgy° Basic Issues in Inter- 
national Relations0 Boston? Allyn and Bacon,
W T "
Triska, Jan F c and David D, Finley„ Soviet Foreign Policyo 
New York? MacMillan and Co„ 1 9 6 8°
108
Triska, Jan F c and H 0 Slusser° The Theory and Law of 
Soviet Treatieso Palo Alto* Calif0s Stanford 
University Press, 1963o
Tucker, Robert C 0 The Spyjet Political Mind0 New York: 
Praeger, 1963 ° — — — —
Turner, G 0 B 0 (ed»). National Security in the Nuclear 
New YorkT”"Praeger, 1960» ' ~ ~~
Van Dyke, Vernorio Pride and Power„ Urbana, 111° s 
University of Illinois Press, 1964°
Wadsworth, J0 J° The Price of Peace„ New Yorks 
Praeger, 1962„
Waltz, Kennetho Man, the State and Ware New Yorks 
Columbia University Press, 1959°
Waskow, A. The Limits of Defense„ Garden City, New Yorks 
Doubleday, T9 6 2 0
Westerfield, H° B ° The Instruments of America8s Foreign 
Policyo New Yorks Crowell, 1963°
Wolfe, T° Wo Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads„ Cambridge 
Mass0 s Harvard University Press, 1964°
Wolfers, Andrewo Discord and Collaboration„ Baltimores 
Johns Hopkins ,~1 962 o ”~ ™ — ’
Zebot, C 0 A 0 The Economics of Competitive Co-existence.New YorkT-—Harper, 1964° —  - —
Periodicals
Amster, Warren0 '’Design for Deterrence,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientist, X.II (May 1956), 164-165°
uAndreevich, E„ A „ Structure and Functions of the Soviet 
Secret Police,” International Affairs (Moscow) 
(March 1956), ppo 23-79o
Angell, Robert C 0 "Content Analysis of Elite Media,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII (Dec° 1964), 329-386° — —
109
Angell, Robert 0 o "The U 0S o International Payments Deficit/' 
Political Science Quarterly, LXXIX (March 196 4 )»
1-24 =
Barghoorn, Frederick C 0 "Soviet Cultural Effort/’ Pro­
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science,
XXXIX, 156-169o — -
Bechoefer, B 0 G 0 "Soviet Attitude Toward Disarmament/’ 
Current History, XVL (Oct0 1963), 193-199o
Beim, David 0 o ’’The Communist Bloc and the Foreign Aid.
Game/’ Western Political Quarterly, XVII (Dec, 1964), 
231-27S„
Berkner, L 0 W„ "Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy/’
Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (Janc 1959), 221-2310
Brecher, M 0, B„ Steinberg, and Jo Stein„ ”A Framework for 
Research on Foreign Policy Behavior/’ Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, U l I  (March 1969), 75-102*
Brennan, D 0 G 0 "Why Outer Space Control," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, XV (May 1959)> 198-202„
Brody, Raymond A 0 "Deterrence Strategies* An Annotated 
Bibliography/' Journal of Conflict Resolution,
IV (Deco 1960), 443-457„
Buchan, Alstairo "The Age of Insecurity/’ Encounter, XXI 
(June 1963), 3-10.
Burns, Arthur L0 "From Balance to Deterrence/’ World 
Politics, IX (July 1957)? 494-529=
Butler, W 0 "Trade and the Less Developed Areas/’ Foreign 
Affairs, XLI (Jan* 1963), 372-383=
Buzzard, A 0 W c "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deter­
rence," World Politics, VIII (Jan0 1956), 228-237=
Coffey, J„ Io "The Soviet View of a Disarmed World,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII (March 1964), 
1- 6 „ ' '
Berliner, James S c Soviet Foreign Economic Competition/’ 
American ECOnomic Review (May 1959), pp = 368-377= 
110
Diamond, S 0 "The Soviet Union Since Khrushchev— New Trends 
and Old Problems, ” Proceedings of the American 
Academy of Political Science, XXVIII (April 1965)? 
entire issueD
Diebold, William*, "The New Situation of International 
Trade Policy,” International Journal, XVIII 
(Autumn 1963)? 425-441°
Dinerstein, H0 S c "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic 
Thinking," Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (Jan„ 1958),
241-252„
o "Soviet Goals and Military Force," Orbis, V 
(Winter 1*96 2) , 425“436<,
Draper, Ted, "The Dominican Crisis,” Commentary, XX 
(Deco 1965)? 60-79o
Encounter, XX, No, 6 (June 1963), entire issue,
Erasmuso "Polycentrism and Proliferation," Survey (Jan*, 
1966), pp0 70-72o
Erickson, John,, "The Military Factor in Soviet Policy,"
International Affairs, XXXIX (April 1963), 214-226o
Fleming, Donald F„ "The Changing Cold War," Annals 9 CCCLI 
(Jan, 1964)? 3-25„
Frankel, Charles,, "The Cultural Contest," Proceedings of 
the American Academy of Political Science, XXIX 
(1969), 140-155 - — —
Frisch, David„ "Arms Reduction; Program and Issues," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, V (Sept*, 1961), 
301-321 .
Gerard, R» "To Prevent Another World War; Truth Detec­
tion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, V (June 1961)
2 1 2 - 2 1 S o
Gilpatrick, R„ L0 "Our Defense Needs; The Long View," 
Foreign Affairs, XLII (April 19 6 4), 366-378„
Glagolev, L  S 0 "Soviet Defense Might and Peaceful Coexist­
ence," International Affairs (Moscow), XI (Spring 
1963), 27-33o
111
Goldman, Marshall I, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet Foreign 
Affairs," Foreign Affairs, X L m  (Jan. 1965), 
27-44°
Greenberg, D 0 S 0 ’’Space Accord: NASA’s Enthusiasm for
East-West Cooperation Not Shared by the Pentagon," 
Science , CXXXVI (April 1962), 135-150°
Griffiths, F 0 J„ G„ "Origins of Peaceful Co-existence," 
Survey, L (Jan. 1964), 195-201°
Harris, 0. "Six Ways of Confusing Issues," Foreign 
Affairs, XL (April 1962), 443-452„
Haskins, Charles P. "Technology, Science and American
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XL (Jan° 1962), 
224-243°
Herman, L° "The Limits of Forced Economic Growth in the 
UcSoS 0R„„" World Politics, XVI*(April 1964)« 
407-40So
Heymann, H° Jr0 "Soviet Foreign Aid As a Problem of U°S° 
Policy," World Politics (July 1960), 16G-1B1o
Horelick, A. L 0 ’’The Cuban Missile Crisis," World Poli­
tics , Xvi (April 1964), 363-370.
Kaplan, Morton A° "The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence," 
World Politics, XI (Oct. I85S), 20-43°
Kautsky, John H. "Myth, Self-fulfilling Prophesy and Sym­
bolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, IX (March 1965)« 
117-130.
, "The National Interests The Entomologist and
the Beetle," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 
X (May 1966), 222-232o
Kent, Geoffreyo "Strategy and Arms Levels, 1945-196$,"
Proceedings of the American Academy of Political 
Science, XXIX (1969)a 21-36. ~  :
Keynes, John Maynard. "National Self-sufficiency," Yale 
Review (Summer 1933)» pp° 754-765°
112
Kilodziejo E 0 "Congressional Responsibility for the Common 
Defense, The Money Problem," Western Political 
Quarterly, XVI (March 1963), *149-160.
Korovin, E 0 "Peaceful Cooperation in Outer Space,"
International Affairs (Moscow), (March 19o2), 
pp„ 22-29.
Kraft, Josephs "The War Thinkers," Esquire, LVIII 
(Sept, 1962), 100-104.
11Leghorn, Robert Si The Problem of Accidental War,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, XIV (June 195$), 
205-209.
Lvov, M„ "United Nations: Results and Prospects,"
International Affairs, IX (1965), 1 -25 <>
Milburn, Thomas W 0 "What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?" 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (June 1959),
'133-145.'
Morgenthau, Hans Ja "The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear 
Strategy," American Political Science Review 
(March I964T, pp. 23-30. ~ '
______"A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American
Political Science Review, LVl (June 1962), 301-310.
Nimitiz, N. "Soviet Expenditures of Scientific Research,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, XVIII (March 1962) 
201-2 2 0.
Osgood, Ge E„ "Suggestions for Winning the War with Com­
munism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, III 
(Deco 1959) > 295-325o
H _Packenham, Richard A s Foreign Aid and the National
Interest," Midwest Journal of Political Science,
X (May 1966), 214-2220
Perlmutter, 0. W 0 "The Neo-realism of Dean Acheson,"
Review of Politics, XXVI (Jan. 1964)5, 100-123»
Pincus, Jo A 0 "What Policy for Commodities?" Foreign 
Affairs. XLII (Jan. 1964), 227-241.
Ra’anan, Uri. "Tactics in the Third World," Survey,
LVII (Oct. 1965), 30-34.
113
"Report of the Clay Commission on Foreign Aid," Political 
Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (Sept. 1963)> 321-361»
Rosecrance, Richard N. ’’Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the 
Future,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, X 
(Sept. 1955), 314-327. “ ~ ~  ”
Schelling, Thomas S. ’’The Role of Deterrence in Total 
Disarmament,” Foreign Affairs, XI (April 1962), 
392-406.
Schilling, Warren R. "The H-Bomb Decision,” Political 
Science Quarterly, LXXVI (March 1961) , 24-46.
. ’’Scientists, Foreign Policy and Politics,” 
American Political Science Review, LlV (June 1962), 
287-301“ ~ “
Shenin, Y. H„ "a Soviet Scientist Looks at Disarmament," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, XX (Jan. 1964), 
19-2 2 .
Sikorsky, H. ’’Economic Foundations of the Peaceful Policy 
of the Socialist Countries," World Marxist Review 
(April 1959), PPo 171-179.
Singer, J. David. "Arms Control and Beyond: A Review of
Thomas C„ Schelling and Morton H„ Halperin, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, VII (March 1963), 122-134.
  "Deterrence and Shelters,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, XVII (Oct. 1961), 415-435 ~
. "Inter-nation Influence: A Formal Model,"
American Political Science Review, LVII (March 1963) 
420-430.
"The Level of Analysis Problem in International 
"Relations,” World Politics, XIV (Oct. 1961), 81-92.
"Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII (Dec. 1964), 
42444857— ”-------- — — ------------
"Stable Deterrence and Its Limits,” Western 
Political Quarterly, XV (Sept. 1962),
114
Singer, J. David. "Strategic Dilemmas: Probability and
Utility," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXXV 
(June 1961), 197-205.
„ "Weapons Management in World Politics," Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, III (Sept. 1963), 301-312.
Singh, Bernardo "Law As a Political Instrument: A
Soviet Model," World Justice, VII (Sept. 1966), 
321-330o
Snyder, 0o H„ "Deterrence and Power," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, IV (June 1960), 163-176.
Sosnovy, T 0 "The Soviet Military Budget," Foreign Affairs. 
XLII (April 1964), 467-494..
Stoessinger, John G. "Financing the UN System," Inter-
# national Conciliation, DXXXVI (Nov. 1961), 197-21 CM
Szilard, Leo. "Minimal Deterrent vs. Saturation Parity," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, XX (March 1964), 
165-170.
Talensky, N. "Sincere? Yes, Realistic? No," International 
Affairs, III (March 1963), 96-100.
Toma, Peter A. "Problem of Foreign Aid," East Europe,
XV (Feb. 1963), 29.
SITucker, R, W„ Force and Foreign Policy," Yale Review,
XLVII (March 1956), 374-392.
Vernon, Raymond. "Foreign Trade and National Defense," 
Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1955)» 77-65.
Waltz, Kenneth. "The Stability of a Bipolar World,"
Daedalus (Summer 1964), pp. 669-900.
Wohlstetter, Albert. "The Delicate Balance of Terror," 
Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (Jan. 1959), 211-234.
Wolfe, Bertram D. "Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign
Policy," Foreign Affairs, XLI (Oct. 1962), 152-170.
Wolfe, T. W. "Shifts in Soviet Strategic thought,"
Foreign Affairs, XLII (April 1964), 478-466.
Zyzniewski, S a J. "Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," Politi­
cal Science Quarterly, LXXIII (June 1956), 206-2347
115
Newspapers (American)
The New York Times 
The Wall Street Journal
Newspapers (Soviet)
Izvetsia 
Kommunist 
Military Thought 
Pravda 
Red Star 
Soviet Union
All of the foregoing Soviet newspapers as translated in 
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, The Joint Committee 
on Slavic Studies,, New York (weekly) „
Governmental Documents
The Agency for International Development, The Story of AID„ 
Washington, D 0C„, no date,,
Foreign Aid Program Today» Washington, D 0C„, 
1964°
Congressional Quarterly Almanac° (quarterly)
Congressional Record, (daily)
U.S. Congressional Committee Reports and Hearingso
UoSo Congresso Joint Economic Committee° "Com­
parisons of the U.S. and Soviet Economies 
$6th Congo, 1st Sess<> Washington, D 0C 0 , 1960 c
’’Current Economic Indicators for the 
UoS0S 0R.” S9th Congo, 1st Sess0 Washington, 
DoC0? 1965o
117
U.S. Department of State. "The Moral Element in 
Foreign Policy," Ho. 37, Sept. 2, 1957, 
pp. 374-379.
"Our Foreign Policies in Asia," No. 32, 
Feb. 28, 1955, B27.
. "The Shield of Faith," No. 23, Nov. 20, 
1950, pp. 800-807.
. "The Sino-Soviet Offensive through 
1981 ,” No. 8 4, March 1962, pp. 26-31+0
. "Soviet Military Doctrine," No. 141, 
Jan. 13, 1963, pp. 1-7.
"U.S. Trade Relations with Europe,"
No. 4 8 , Feb. 4, 1968, pp. 176-181.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1963 and 1968. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, 19o9»
U.N. Economic and Social Council. Official Records, 
(annual)
U.N. Economic and Social Council. "Ways and
Means of Promoting Trade," E/33$9, June 14,
1 963.
The U.S. in World Affairs. (Annual.) Vols. for 1960-1968 
edited by Richard P. Stebbins.
Pamphlets for Limited Circulation
Central Intelligence Agency. "The CIA.” Spring 1961. 
(Mimeo)
